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I.

INTRODUCTION

The study of open tenancies-in-common leaves little doubt that
1
tax law affects industry norms and individuals’ decisions. Open tenancies-in-common have developed primarily to provide Internal
Revenue Code section 1031 like-kind exchange opportunities for sel2
lers of real property. Typically, any disposition of property generates
a gain or loss that figures into the taxable income of the person dis∗
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1
See, e.g., Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Section 1031: We Don’t Need Another Hero, 60 S.
CAL. L. REV. 397 (1987) (challenging the traditional stated justification for section
1031); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and Simplicity: Let
Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 459, 479 (1993) (“There is no
good reason that investors should be able to move among various real estate investments without paying taxes on realized gains when the same privilege is not accorded
to reinvestment of sales proceeds in a different investment.”). See Bradley T. Borden
& W. Richey Wyatt, Syndicated Tenancy-in-Common Arrangements: How Tax-Motivated
Real Estate Transactions Raise Serious Nontax Issues, 18 PROB. & PROP. 18, 18 (2004) (describing real estate syndicators’ efforts to create viable replacement property for investors seeking to complete section 1031 exchanges). Open tenancies-in-common
may raise questions or confirm positions regarding the appropriateness of certain tax
laws. For example, several commentators are already critical of section 1031. But see
Bradley T. Borden, The Like-Kind Exchange Equity Conundrum, 60 FLA. L. REV. 643,
667–68, 695–96 (2008) (arguing that equity generally supports tax-free like-kind exchanges, but not exchanges of undivided interests for interests owned in severalty).
This Article leaves discussion of those topics for a different venue. Instead, this Article focuses on the existence of open tenancies-in-common and considers the issues
they raise in the current context.
2
All section references are to the Internal Revenue Code, unless stated otherwise.
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3

posing of the property. Property owners may avoid the immediate
recognition of gain under section 1031 if they acquire like-kind
4
property in exchange for the relinquished property. If two properties are like-kind, many property owners may be indifferent about
which property they own, but they may hesitate to change ownership
5
if they must pay tax on the change-of-ownership transaction. Thus,
to accept a purchase offer, property owners often need assurance that
they will be able to find suitable like-kind property for reinvestment.
In times of rising prices, purchase offers tend to increase, and the
availability of replacement property tends to decrease, causing a difficult situation for many owners wishing to remain invested in like-kind
6
property. Furthermore, property owners at the end of their property
management life cycles may wish to acquire property that has less
7
demanding management obligations. Finally, investors may prefer
8
investment-grade property with a credit tenant as replacement property, which they may not be able to acquire individually.
Real estate syndicators, who recognized property owners’ needs
for accessible investment-grade replacement property with minimal

3

Gross income includes gains from dealings in property. I.R.C. § 61(a)(3)
(2000). The Internal Revenue Code defines gain or loss on the disposition of property and generally requires recognition of gain or loss. Id. § 1001(a), (c). Noncorporate taxpayers are entitled to a deduction for losses, to the extent of gains plus
some additional amounts. Id. §§ 165(a), 1211(b).
4
See Id. § 1031(a)(1). Property owners also lose any losses realized on the disposition of property. See id. Generally, taxpayers prefer loss recognition because it provides a tax benefit by lowering taxable income. Because gains increase tax liability,
taxpayers generally prefer to avoid gain recognition. Because open tenancies-incommon are used by property owners seeking gain deferral, this Article focuses on
gain deferral with little additional mention of loss deferral.
5
Stated otherwise, the opportunity to defer gain recognition may make property
available that owners would not ordinarily sell because of the tax implications. See
Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of Realization and Recognition Rules Under the
Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX. L. REV. 1, 45 (1992) (“The similarity of the items exchanged suggests weaker nontax reasons for exchanging them, and thus a greater likelihood that tax such exchanges would merely deter them, rather than raise revenue.”).
6
The difficulty arises because the owners sell property at high prices but are unable to identify and acquire replacement property within the statutory time periods.
See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3) (2000) (requiring that exchangers identify replacement
property within forty-five days after the transfer of the relinquished property, and
that they generally acquire replacement property within 180 days after the transfer of
the relinquished property).
7
Property owners often confess the three “Ts” of ownership (tenants, trash, and
toilets) make property management tiresome. See Kevin Thomason, How to Keep the
TIC’s from Biting, 42 S. FED. TAX INST. F-1, F-1 (2007).
8
A credit tenant is a tenant with a high credit rating, such as a large corporation
or professional services firm.
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management demands, created open tenancies-in-common.
An
open tenancy-in-common is an ownership arrangement of a large
piece of real estate in which several unrelated, unaffiliated, and often
10
The
unacquainted persons take undivided ownership interests.
members of an open tenancy-in-common hire third parties to manage the property, thus relieving themselves of management responsibilities. As long as the undivided interests are deemed real property
for section 1031 exchange purposes, they should generally be likekind to other real property and qualify as valid replacement prop11
erty. The combination of accessibility, section 1031 qualification,
and minimal management responsibility for the co-owners made
open tenancies-in-common popular a popular investment vehicle for
certain property owners. Property owners from all over the country
began investing exchange proceeds in open tenancies-in-common,
and an industry grew up to package, market, manage, and facilitate
12
the creation of open tenancies-in-common.
Before the 2007 and 2008 market contraction, open tenanciesin-common witnessed explosive growth. From 2002 through 2006,
the amount of equity invested in securitized open tenancy-in13
In absolute dollars, the
common interests grew significantly.
9

See Borden & Wyatt, supra note 1 (recognizing that some real estate syndicators
have added tenancy-in-common interests to their traditional offerings of limited
partnership interests); 2nd Quarter 2008 Numbers, TIC |TALK Q. (Omni Research &
Consulting, LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah), Fall 2008, at 5 (listing sixty-five sponsors of
tenancy-in-common arrangements). Omni Research & Consulting, LLC, is an affiliate of Omni Brokerage, Inc. Id. at 2. “OMNI Brokerage is a nationwide securities
brokerage firm specializing in investment real estate for the qualified and accredited
investor. Distinctive in the marketplace for its focus on Tenant-In-Common (TIC)
investments, OMNI has been providing investors with replacement property solutions for 1031 exchanges since 1995.” 1031 Exchange and TIC Investments—Omni
Brokerage, http://www.omni1031.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2009). Industry participants often refer to open tenancies-in-common as “syndicated tenancies-incommon.” See, e.g., Darryl Steinhause, TICs as Real Estate: Another Nail in the Coffin,
TIC |TALK Q. (Omni Research & Consulting, LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah), Fall 2008, at
12.
10
See infra text accompanying notes 44–66
11
See Rev. Rul. 73-476, 1973-2 C.B. 300 (ruling that an exchange of an undivided
interest real property for an interest in a single real property qualifies for section
1031 nonrecognition); BRADLEY T. BORDEN, TAX-FREE LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES ¶ 3.4[4]
(2008).
12
See Terrence Floyd Cuff, Section 1031 Exchanges Involving Tenancies-in-Common,
29 REAL EST. TAX’N 53, 54 (2002); Tenant-in-Common Association, http://www.
ticassoc.org/index.php (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (describing the open tenancy-incommon industry).
13
A securitized open tenancy-in-common is one marketed and sold as a security
under federal and state securities laws. Apparently some syndicators also sold interests in open tenancies-in-common as real estate, but that practice appears to have
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amount of equity invested in 2001 was approximately $167 million,
14
but it grew to $3.7 billion in 2006. That represents a 2116 % growth
in just five years. Those figures do not include the amount borrowed
to acquire property. Assuming acquisition indebtedness is about fifty
percent of the total value of the property, the industry is approximately twice as large as the amount of invested equity, meaning the
15
market peaked at approximately $7.5 billion in 2006. After peaking
in 2006, the amount of equity invested in open tenancy-in-common
16
interests predictably contracted as the real estate market contracted.
Even with the recent contraction, the rapid early growth indicates
that some form of open tenancies-in-common will likely survive the
17
As a relatively new form of property
current market downturn.
ownership, open tenancies-in-common deserve critical legal, economic, and tax consideration. This Article presents the first such
analysis.
Contrast open tenancies-in-common with close tenancies-in18
common. The co-owners of close tenancies know each other and
generally manage the property together or leave management to one
19
of the co-owners. They work together to acquire the property or
acquire it by inheritance. Property owned in a close tenancy-incommon will generally be smaller than property owned in an open
stopped. See Complaint at 4, Spann Trust v. DBSI Inc., No. CV OC 0820435 (Idaho
Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2008) [hereinafter Spann Complaint].
14
See Brady Flamm, 2006 Numbers, TIC |TALK Q. (Omni Research & Consulting,
LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah), Winter 2007, at 3. The size of the industry doubled for
2002 ($357 million), 2003 ($756 million), and 2004 ($1.775 billion), and it grew sizably in 2005 ($3.229 billion). Id. Numbers are not available for the sales of nonsecuritized interests. As discussed below, securities laws suggest that interests in open
tenancies-in-common fall within the definition of security. See infra text accompanying notes 131–33. That characterization is another reason to focus on securitized
open tenancies-in-common.
15
That estimate makes open tenancies-in-common a relatively small portion of
the estimated $210 billion of total property exchanged under section 1031 in 2003
(the latest year that such estimates were published by members of Deloitte Tax). See
Dean A. Halfacre, Measuring the 1031 Market, TIC |TALK (Omni Brokerage, Inc., Salt
Lake City, Utah), Winter 2005, at 6.
16
In 2007, less than $3 billion of equity closed on open tenancies-in-common.
2nd Quarter 2008 Numbers, TIC |TALK Q. (Omni Research & Consulting, LLC, Salt
Lake City, Utah), Fall 2008, at 5. The market continued to contract during 2008. See
id.
17
This assumes tax law continues incentivize investment in tenancy-in-common
interests. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the viability of open tenancies-in-common in
a non-tax-favored environment).
18
This Article uses the term open tenancies-in-common to parlay vernacular used
in scholarly work to compare open business arrangements to close business arrangements.
19
See infra text accompanying notes 102–05.
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tenancy-in-common. Traditionally, close tenancies-in-common had
simple co-ownership agreements, if they had them at all. Open tenancies-in-common, by contrast, have sophisticated co-ownership
agreements. Their formation also requires the coordinated efforts of
many parties, including promoters, managers, securities broker20
dealers, attorneys, and other advisors. A significant body of corporate-law scholarship similarly considers the differences between open
21
and close corporations and other business arrangements. This Article recognizes differences, both legal and economic, between open
and close tenancies-in-common.
Tax law motivated the initial emergence of open tenancies-incommon and greatly influences their ownership structures today.
The viability of open tenancies-in-common to serve as like-kind replacement property depends significantly on the tax classification of
open tenancies-in-common. If tax law treats an open tenancy-incommon as a tax partnership, the interest will not be like-kind real
22
property and will not qualify for nonrecognition. Tax classification
therefore affects many of the structural components of open tenancies-in-common, as parties structure them to comply with tax law’s tenancy-in-common classification. The tax classification of a coownership arrangement, such as an open tenancy-in-common, is not
23
a state law question. Instead, it is a matter of federal tax law and ex24
ists primarily in the common law definition of tax partnership. An
arrangement that is not a tax corporation is either a tax partnership
20

See infra Part II.A.
Generally, the focus is on open and close corporations. See, e.g., FRANK H.
EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
(1991) (focusing generally on open corporations, but focusing specifically on close
corporations in Chapter 9); MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM § 4.2 (2000)
(discussing the economic theory for separating ownership and management and the
optimal size of a firm). More recent commentary also considers other business arrangements, such as limited liability companies. See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Minority
Oppression and The Limited Liability Company: Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation
History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883 (2005).
22
See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(D) (2000) (excluding partnership interests from the
application of section 1031). Furthermore, a partnership interest is personal property, so it cannot be like-kind to real property. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, § 502, 6 U.L.A. 156
(2001); see also Rev. Rul. 72-151, 1972-1 C.B. 225 (ruling that an exchange of real
property for machinery did not satisfy the like-kind property requirement).
23
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(1) (as amended in 2006) (“Whether an organization is an entity separate from its owners for federal tax purposes is a matter of
federal tax law and does not depend on whether the organization is recognized as an
entity under local law.”).
24
See Bradley T. Borden, The Federal Definition of Tax Partnership, 43 HOUS. L. REV.
925, 975–1001 (2006) (reviewing the common law tests used to determine whether
an arrangement is a tax partnership).
21
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or a tenancy-in-common, as determined by the definition of tax part25
26
nership. The definition of tax partnership, however, is unclear.
Such lack of clarity appears to have stymied the growth of the open
27
tenancy-in-common industry for a number of years.
A 2002 IRS
publication provided guidance regarding the classification of coowned rental real property and was the catalyst that spurred the
28
growth of the industry. The IRS’s guidance dictates, to a significant
degree, the structure of open tenancies-in-common. This Article reveals, however, that some of the tax-driven elements find little support in the common law tax definition of tenancies-in-common and
place serious strains on the economic tendencies of co-owners and
managers.
The coming together of promoters, managers, and numerous
investors with disparate backgrounds, varying levels of knowledge
about real estate investment and management, and potentially different objectives creates economic and legal issues that the structure of
open tenancies-in-common must contemplate. For example, man25

Id. at 936–38.
See WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS ¶ 3.01[1] (4th
ed. 2007) (describing the definition of “tax partnership” as the most basic and perhaps most difficult question of partnership taxation).
27
See supra note 9 (stating that Omni Brokerage was in the business of providing
replacement property solutions since 1995, but the industry’s significant growth did
not occur until 2002). The unclear definition of tax partnership led taxpayers to
seek private guidance from the IRS regarding the proper classification of open tenancies-in-common. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-19-014 (May 12, 2000). Shortly after
providing that guidance, the IRS publicly stated that it would not provide guidance
on the classification of co-ownership arrangements until it had studied the issue further. Rev. Proc. 2000-46, 2000-2 C.B. 438. The moratorium on rulings appears to be
a consequence of the inflow of ruling requests and the IRS’s awareness of emergence
of the open tenancy-in-common industry. See Rev. Proc. 2000-46 § 2, 2000-2 C.B. 438;
Bradley T. Borden, Exchanges Involving Tenancy-in-Common Interests Can Be Tax-Free,
PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES, Jan. 2003, at 4–5 (reviewing briefly the development of the
open tenancy-in-common industry).
28
The guidance came in the form of a revenue procedure, which lists several
conditions that a tenancy-in-common generally must satisfy to receive a favorable ruling from the IRS regarding the arrangement’s tax classification. See Rev. Rul. 200222, 2002-1 C.B. 733. Although the revenue procedure is merely ruling guidelines,
taxpayers rely upon it as though it provides a safe harbor for classification. If an arrangement meets substantially all of the conditions in the revenue procedure, tax
advisors will generally provide an opinion letter supporting the non-partnership classification for tax purposes. See Bradley T. Borden & Todd D. Keator, Tax Opinions in
TIC Offerings and Reverse TIC Exchanges, 23 REAL EST. J. 88, 89–96 (2007) (predicting
that common deviations from the revenue procedure will not prevent tax advisors
from providing a “should” level opinion, but significant deviations will likely result in
a “more likely than not” opinion). Following the publication of Revenue Procedure
2002-22, the equity invested in open tenancies-in-common doubled annually for
three years. See supra note 14.
26
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agement is often separate from ownership in open tenancies-incommon, so the owners must consider how they might align the
manager’s interests with their own. Co-owners will wish to protect the
property from claims of other owners’ creditors, so arrangements
29
Tenants in common traditionally
must provide entity shielding.
have the power to dispose of undivided interests, partition the prop30
erty, and take possession of the property.
Such powers, if unrestricted in open tenancies-in-common, could diminish the property’s
value and create unworkable structures. Ownership structures of
open tenancies-in-common have evolved to provide such restric31
tions.
The emergence of open tenancies-in-common raises several
questions about their independent viability and value. Because they
arose to fill a tax purpose, their existence may depend solely on the
continued tax preference. The cumbersome open tenancy-incommon structure calls into question whether direct ownership is necessary to preserve tenancy-in-common classification under tax law.
Finally, the resources devoted to open tenancies-in-common have
created a new way to own and manage property. Many aspects of
open tenancy-in-common structures may be transferable to close tenancies-in-common that heretofore could not justify the application of
resources to invent such structures. This Article describes the industry that services open tenancies-in-common, examines the tax, legal,
and economic aspects of open tenancies-in-common, and considers
the issues involved with the application for close tenancies-in32
common to open tenancies-in-common.

29

See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of
the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1343–50 (2006) (describing the economics of entity
shielding and its importance to business arrangements).
30
See John V. Orth, Tenancies in Common, in 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY §
32.02 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed. 1994) (recognizing the right to transfer and partition); Alfred A. Heon, Comment, The Liability of a Cotenant to Other Cotenants for
Rents, Profits and Use and Occupation, 42 MARQ. L. REV. 363, 363 (1959) (“[E]ach cotenant of a tenancy-in-common had an equal and several right of entry and possession, and the possession of one was the possession of all.”).
31
See infra note 250 and accompanying text (discussing common restrictions
placed on disposition and partition and the reasons for them).
32
Space limitations restrict the potential coverage of various issues raised by
open tenancies-in-common. This Article focuses on tax law, property law, securities
law, and economics. Further analysis could also consider the implications under
bankruptcy law and corporate law.
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II. THE INDUSTRY AND PRODUCTS
An industry has grown up to package, market, sell, and manage
open tenancies-in-common. In fact, industry participants have created a trade organization—the Tenancy-in-Common Association
33
(TICA). Forming an open tenancy-in-common requires the coordination of many different functions, which industry participants have
divided along lines of specialization. Sponsors package open tenan34
cies-in-common. They locate property, put it under contract or acquire it, arrange for financing, and ensure the property is ready for
35
transfer on the transfer closing date. The early success of open tenancies-in-common attracted many sponsors—as many as sixty-five
sponsors were serving the securitized open tenancy-in-common mar36
ket in 2008.
37
Because open tenancy-in-common interests are securities, broker-dealers generally handle the marketing and selling of open ten38
ancy-in-common interests. A broker-dealer is licensed to trade secu39
Registered
rities for his own account or for customers.
representatives often work as independent contractors for open tenancy-in-common broker-dealers and have direct interaction with in-

33

See Tenant-In-Common Association, supra note 12 (describing TICA and providing information about the tenancy-in-common industry and promoting open tenancies-in-common).
34
See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-2.
35
See Borden & Wyatt, supra note 1, at 19. If promoters put the property under
contract instead of acquiring it, they assign their rights in the contract to investors
who then close on it. Id.
36
See 19 of 65 Sponsors Surveyed Closed Deals in the 2nd Quarter, TIC |TALK Q. (Omni
Research & Consulting, LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah), Fall 2008, at 5. Undoubtedly,
others marketed and sold tenancies-in-common as real estate during the same period. For example, DBSI purportedly sold tenancy-in-common interests as real estate
during that period. See Spann Complaint, supra note 13, at 12.
37
See infra note 131.
38
See, e.g., 1031 Exchange and TIC Investments—Omni Brokerage, http://www.
omni1031.com (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (providing information about Omni Brokerage, which specializes in selling tenancy-in-common interests and claims to be the
largest broker-dealer in the tenancy-in-common industry, based upon equity raised);
infra note 131 (discussing the definition of a security and why open tenancy-incommon interests fall within that definition).
39
See Securities Registration Act of 1934 § 3(a)(4)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)
(2006) (defining broker as “any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others”); Id. § 78c(a)(5) (defining dealer as “any
person engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account,
through a broker or otherwise”); Id. § 78l(a) (requiring broker-dealers to register
with the Securities and Exchange Commission).
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41

vestors. They work together to sell the interests. Registered representatives may work exclusively for a broker-dealer or may own an exchange facilitator business and sell tenancy-in-common interests as a
42
side venture. Such a dual purpose puts the registered representative in direct contact with potential investors. Because most investors
in open tenancies-in-common generally use section 1031 exchange
proceeds to invest, broker-dealers and their representatives seek re43
ferrals from exchange facilitators. The objective is to attract investors who have sold real estate as a part of an intended section 1031
exchange (or who are contemplating such a sale) but have not yet
committed to acquire replacement property or who are still looking
for suitable replacement property. Exchange facilitators often know
these potential investors and are excellent referral sources.
A. Creation of Open Tenancies-in-Common
The creation of an open tenancy-in-common requires the coming together of several parties in a multi-step process. The investors
and promoters often begin their processes independently of each
other. They might meet only after they have each progressed along
their respective process cycles. First, property owners sell real property as part of an intended section 1031 exchange, generally using a
44
The property
qualified intermediary to facilitate the exchange.
owners, who eventually end up acquiring interests together in a specific open tenancy-in-common, probably do not know each other at
the time they sell their own properties. At the time of disposition,
they may have some preferred property identified as replacement
property and have no intent to acquire interest in an open tenancyin-common, but those plans may be frustrated through the exchange
process. Other property owners may sell property with the intent to
45
exchange into an interest in an open tenancy-in-common. Second,
40

This information is based on the Author’s professional interaction and informal discussions with broker-dealers and registered representatives.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-18. Most section 1031 exchanges are structured as multiple-party exchanges with a qualified intermediary receiving the proceeds from the sale of the relinquished property and facilitating the exchange. See
BORDEN, supra note 11, ¶ 4.4[3] (discussing the technical requirements that property
owners must satisfy to obtain section 1031 nonrecognition for a multiple-party exchange facilitated by a qualified intermediary and describing the process of a multiple-party exchange).
45
Section 1031 allows property owners to transfer relinquished property and later acquire replacement property, if they identify the replacement property within

BORDEN (FINAL)

396

4/6/2009 10:53:08 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:387

independent of the actions of the property owners, open tenancy-incommon sponsors locate and arrange to acquire the property for a
46
Sponsors negotiate the purchase
new open tenancy-in-common.
price of the property, secure blanket nonrecourse financing needed
to acquire the property, and negotiate the terms of an appropriate
47
Thus,
lease, if the property has a single lessee or master lessee.
sponsors package the property and prepare it for acquisition by investors.
48
Third, sponsors prepare an offering memorandum. The offering memorandum, including any addenda, will likely be hundreds of
49
pages long and include copious information.
For example, the
memorandum might include information such as risk factors relating
to the property, tax matters, financing arrangements, and invest50
ments in the property. The memorandum will also include information about the property and the market in which the property is
51
located. The memorandum typically identifies the sponsors and the
managers of the property, or the master tenant, describing the manner in which the co-owners will compensate them and their prior per52
formance. Additionally, the memorandum should summarize the
relevant agreements that co-owners will enter into, including rights of
first offer or refusal and call-option agreements, the tenants-incommon agreement, and the property and asset management
53
agreement. The memorandum also includes copies of such agreements as exhibits, along with a tax opinion addressing the tax classification of the open tenancy-in-common and the section 1031 implica-

forty-five days after the relinquished property transfer. I.R.C. § 1031(a)(3)(A)
(2000). Often property owners will sell relinquished property with no idea as to what
they will acquire as like-kind replacement property and use the forty-five day identification period to find suitable replacement property. See Thomason, supra note 7 at
F-1 (describing a typical situation that creates demand for a tenancy-in-common interest).
46
See Cuff, supra note 12, at 54.
47
See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-19.
48
See id. at F-20.
49
Information about offering memoranda comes from confidential materials on
file with the Author. This Article refers to the confidential materials as “Confidential
Private Placement Memorandum—P.M.” because the memorandum provided for
property-management structures, as “Confidential Private Placement Memorandum—M.L.” for the memorandum issued for master-lease structures, or collectively
as “Confidential Private Placement Memoranda” for both types of memoranda.
50
See Confidential Private Placement Memoranda, supra note 49.
51
See id.
52
See id.
53
See id.
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54

tions of acquiring an interest in the property. Because interests in
open tenancies-in-common are likely securities, the offering should
55
comply with the exceptions to the securities registration rules. Most
interests are offered under the Regulation D exception to the securities registration regime and the offering is often limited to accredited
56
investors.
Fourth, the promoters present the tenancy-in-common offerings
to the broker-dealers who solicit investments. Because the primary
investors are property owners who have sold relinquished property as
part of an intended section 1031 exchange, the broker-dealers look
57
to qualified intermediaries for referrals to potential investors. Qualified intermediaries have knowledge about the property owner’s net
58
worth because they hold exchange proceeds.
Thus, qualified intermediaries can perform initial screenings and introduce brokerdealers to those property owners with exchange proceeds that exceed
59
the net worth element of the accredited investor definition. Ultimately, interested investors execute the necessary documents and
prepare for closing.
60
Finally, the transaction closes. Qualified intermediaries transfer investors’ exchange proceeds and the lender transfers loan proceeds to the seller of the property. Title of the property passes to the
61
investors, who take the property as tenants-in-common. Advisors,
such as accountants and lawyers, the sponsor, and the broker-dealers,
62
receive their fees and commissions at the closing. The total fees
and commissions can equal as much as nine percent of the total value
63
of the property.
Although investment in an open tenancy-in-common is passive,
the structure—prompted by lenders—generally requires each co54
55
56
57

See id.
See infra text accompanying notes 131–33.
See Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 96.
This is based upon the Author’s experience working in the section 1031 indus-

try.
58

Id.
Qualified intermediaries are not regulated, so they may not be bound by rules
of confidentiality—allowing them to share information with registered representatives. They should, however, be careful not to violate the anti-disclosure rules of
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which may apply. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, 15
U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (2006) (imposing privacy rules upon financial institutions, the definition of which may include qualified intermediaries).
60
See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-22.
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
See Confidential Private Placement Memoranda—P.M., supra note 49.
59
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owner to form a special purpose entity to hold undivided interests in
64
the property. Thus, most co-owners form a single-member limited
65
liability company, which tax law generally disregards, to acquire and
hold the undivided interest in the property. The co-owners take actions through those entities. After closing, the co-owners receive
regular rent payments and service the blanket loan, but the managers
or master lessees may handle the payment before making distribu66
tions to the co-owners.
B. Open Tenancy-in-Common Structures
Promoters generally use one of two structures for open tenancies-in-common: (1) the property-management structure or (2) the
67
master-lease structure. Under the property-management structure,
the co-owners hire a third party—usually the promoter—to manage
68
the property. The property manager agrees to provide an annual
budget and disburse revenue, net of operating expenses, to the coowners. Operating expenses include loan payments and a reasonable
reserve for improvements. The manager also furnishes financial re69
ports and other notifications to the co-owners. The management
agreement should contain provisions addressing the term for which
70
the manager will serve. Because the promoters create, market, and
manage the arrangements, they draft the governing documents to se71
cure a long-term position as manager. The long-term structure of
the management arrangement indicates that the co-owners understand that the acquisition of an interest in the property is subject to
72
the promoter managing the property indefinitely. Thus, investors
64

See id.
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(a)(4) (as amended in 2006).
66
See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-23.
67
See id. at F-2.
68
See id.; Confidential Private Placement Memorandum—P.M., supra note 49.
69
See Confidential Private Placement Memorandum—P.M., supra note 49.
70
See id.
71
See Confidential Private Placement Memoranda, supra note 49
72
See Confidential Private Placement Memorandum—P.M., supra note 49. The
management agreement may provide, for example, that the property manager will
serve for twenty years, unless the manager or the co-owners terminate the agreement
or sell the property before the end of twenty years. See id. Although the co-owners
may have the right to terminate the management agreement, a termination by the
co-owners may allow the lender to accelerate the loan and trigger the manager’s option to acquire the interest from the terminating co-owners. See id. To comply with
the IRS’s guidance, the co-owners must renew the management agreement on an
annual basis. See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.12, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (discussing the IRS’s requirement that managers’ contracts be renewed annually). Such a termination generally will, however, trigger the manager’s option or the lender’s right to accelerate
65
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should consider part of the promoter’s compensation to include the
management fee. The benefits of the property-management structure are that it is simpler than the master-lease structure and the co73
owners participate in rent growth. The limitations of the propertymanagement structure are that co-owners can engage only in limited
74
activities, either directly or indirectly through an agent, and the co75
owners have no protection should rents or occupancies decline.
Under the master-lease structure, the co-owners lease the prop76
erty to a master lessee. The master lessee is usually the sponsor, or
an affiliate of the sponsor, who subleases the property to tenants,
hires and pays a property manager, and bears the expenses of operat77
ing the property. The master lessee will also generally service any
blanket liability secured by the property and pay the co-owners a
fixed percentage of their cash investment (with possible rent bonuses
78
based on the gross revenues of the property). The master lessee
reaps the excess of the payments it is obligated to make to cover ex79
Thus, if the
penses, service the liability, and pay the co-owners.
rents increase and the expenses stay the same, the master lessee’s
profit will increase, but a decrease in rents or an increase in expenses
will reduce the master lessee’s profit. This structure should shift the
property’s economic risk of loss to the master lessee. To the extent
the master lessee does not have sufficient capital to meet its obligations (as is often the case), the risk of loss shifts to the co-owners
80
when rental income decreases sufficiently. As a consequence, any
claims that the master-lease structure protects the co-owners from
81
downturns in the rental market are often illusory. As with the propthe loan. Thus, as a practical matter, the co-owners do not have a viable opportunity
to terminate the management agreement.
73
See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-2.
74
See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.11, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (providing that co-owners may
perform only customary tenant services).
75
See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-2 through F-3.
76
See id. at F-3; Confidential Private Placement Memorandum—M.L., supra note
49.
77
See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-3; Private Placement Memorandum—M.L.,
supra note 49.
78
See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-3; Private Placement Memorandum—M.L.,
supra note 49.
79
See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-3; Private Placement Memorandum—M.L.,
supra note 49.
80
See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-3 (stating that most master lessees are thinly
capitalized).
81
See id. The private placement memorandum for typical master-lease structures
identifies the limited capital of the master tenant as a risk to co-owners. See Private
Placement Memorandum—M.L., supra note 49. The memorandum notifies poten-
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erty-management structure, the master-lease structure commits the
82
owners to a long-term relationship with the promoter. The longterm relationship indicates that the promoters consider rents retained by the master lessee to be part of their economic interest in
the arrangement.
The master-lease structure benefits co-owners by providing a
flexible vehicle for operating the properties safely within the IRS’s
83
guidance. The limitation of the master-lease structure is that it is
84
more complex to organize, so the co-owners sacrifice simplicity to
obtain tax certainty. Thus, the main differences between the masterlease structure and the property-management structure are the level
of tax certainty (the property-management structure provides greater
certainty), the level of structural complexity (the master-lease structure is simpler), and the potential to share in rental increases (coowners of a property-management structure benefit directly from increases).
C. Delaware Statutory Trusts
Although most open tenancies-in-common are structured to be
state-law tenancies-in-common, the IRS allows promoters to package
open tenancies-in-common in Delaware statutory trusts, subject to
85
significant restrictions. With such structures, the promoters form a
Delaware statutory trust that acquires the property, and the investors
86
use exchange proceeds to acquire interests in the statutory trust.

tial investors that the master tenant agrees to pay rent to co-owners without regard to
the economic success of the property and warns the co-owners that their recourse
against the master tenant is limited to the assets of the master tenant, which mainly
include the master tenant’s right to rent from the subtenants. See id. Such a notice
may be reserved for the dense pages of the offering memorandum and may not be
prominent in other marketing efforts, such as referrals to broker-dealers from qualified intermediaries, accountants, lawyers, or others who may recommend that a
property owner consider a tenancy-in-common investment. See, e.g., Video: How a
TIC works and the Benefits to the Investor (Tenant-in-Common Association 2006),
http://www.ticassoc.org/sections/education.php (last visited Mar. 17, 2009) (presenting the benefits of an investment in open tenancies-in-common without discussing the risks). Commentators do, however, recognize the risk. See, e.g., Thomason,
supra note 7, at F-3.
82
See Private Placement Memorandum—M.L., supra note 49.
83
See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-3.
84
See id.
85
See Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191; Richard M. Lipton et al., Delaware Statutory Trusts and 1031: A Marriage Made in Heaven or Just a Pipe Dream?, 101 J. TAX’N 140,
147–50 (2004) (discussing the limited use of Delaware statutory trusts under the ruling).
86
See Lipton et al., supra note 85, at 145.
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The IRS disregards the statutory trust as a separate entity, so the investors are treated as directly owning interests in the underlying
property, which helps the interests satisfy the section 1031 like-kind
87
property requirement. The benefit of assigning a Delaware statutory trust is that the investors do not have to individually take undi88
vided interests in the property. Instead, the statutory trust takes title
to the property in severalty, and the investors acquire interests in the
89
statutory trust. The use of a Delaware statutory trust thus helps simplify the structure and transfer of property.
Business law commentators predicted that statutory trusts would
90
gain favor and create new uses as a choice of legal entity. The use as
an open tenancy-in-common structure is evidence of the prescience
of those observations. Statutory trusts provide owners limited liability, create entity shielding, and grant almost unlimited contractual
91
freedom. Those features make them attractive generally, but they
are particularly useful for open tenancies-in-common. As discussed
below, the IRS’s guidance requires open tenancies-in-common to
92
have certain features. The contractual flexibility of statutory trusts
93
allows the members to satisfy those requirements. The members of
a statutory trust cause the statutory trust to lease the property to a
94
master lessee.
Obtaining tenancy-in-common classification to satisfy the section
1031 like-kind property requirement motivated the formation of the
general structures. The various structures provide investors with
choices, but tax classification greatly influences the details of each
type of structure. Even though tax law is the primary driver of open
87

See Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191.
See Thomason, supra note 7, at F-14.
89
Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191.
90
The business trust effectively represents the minimum required of law in creating a strong entity—asset partitioning and, in particular, strong entity shielding—and
leaves the rest to be determined by contract. The business trust can thus be seen as
the final step in the historical evolution of commercial entities. See Hansmann et al.,
supra note 29, at 1397.
91
See id.
92
See infra Part III.
93
One obvious requirement the co-owners cannot satisfy is the direct-ownership.
Delaware statutory trusts are separate legal entities that own the property. The IRS
has, however, agreed to waive the direct-ownership requirement for properly structured Delaware statutory trusts. See Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191. That sanction
may represent a willingness by the IRS to consider disregarding other multiplemember legal entities, a position the Author advocates. See Borden, supra note 24, at
1008–11, 1026.
94
See Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191 (considering a Delaware statutory interest with a master-lease structure).
88
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tenancy-in-common structures, promoters and investors must also
consider other legal aspects and economic characteristics of such arrangements. Thus, economics, business law, and property law also affect the structure and features of open tenancies-in-common.
III. FEATURES OF OPEN TENANCIES-IN-COMMON
Ownership, management, and transferability of interests are
three main features of open tenancies-in-common that tax law affects.
The tax-driven features of each open tenancy-in-common reflect a
general effort to comply with the IRS’s guidance in order to avoid
95
having the IRS treat the arrangement as a tax partnership. These
features, however, often veer from the common law tax definition of
tenancy-in-common, leaving commentators confused by the IRS’s
96
guidance. Although this guidance is merely a list of conditions for
97
advanced private rulings regarding classification, tax and legal advisors carefully consider it when structuring open tenancies-in98
common. Therefore, open tenancies-in-common rarely deviate significantly from the guidance, even though the guidance may not fol99
low the common-law tax definition of tenancy-in-common. Substantial compliance with the IRS’s guidance creates legal structures that
100
are complicated and raise economic issues. The relative newness of
open tenancies-in-common hopefully suggests that the passage of
time will help simplify and improve the features discussed below. In

95

See Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 88–89.
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 139-157.
97
See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 3, 2002-1 C.B. 733.
98
See Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 88. Practitioners consider the guidance
a safe harbor because they cannot fathom the IRS taking a position that an arrangement satisfying all of the conditions in the guidance is anything other than a tenancyin-common. Id.
The Service’s disavowal to the contrary notwithstanding, as a practical
matter, the guidelines in Rev. Proc. 2002-22 will effectively become a
safe harbor for structuring TIC interests that can be acquired as replacement property in like-kind exchanges. It can be anticipated that
tax practitioners will be comfortable issuing a favorable opinion to taxpayers with respect to TIC interests that satisfy the requirements in the
guidelines, whereas practitioners will be less comfortable issuing favorable opinions if the TIC interests are not described in these guidelines.
Richard M. Lipton, New Rules Likely to Increase Use of Tenancy-in-Common Ownership in
Like-Kind Exchanges, 96 J. TAX’N 303, 306 (2002).
99
See Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 88–96 (identifying situations in which
tax advisors will provide a favorable legal opinion even if the arrangement deviates
from the IRS’s guidance).
100
See, e.g., infra Part III.C (describing the unrestricted partition and disposition
requirements and the mechanisms co-owners use to circumvent those requirements).
96
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the meantime, formal structures intended to substantially comply
with the IRS’s guidance will govern open tenancies-in-common.
The formal structure of open tenancies-in-common stands in
stark contrast to the ownership structure of many close tenancies-in101
The creation and method of acquiring interests in close
common.
tenancies-in-common often explain the lack of formal ownership arrangements. Co-owners unintentionally create close tenancies-incommon by operation of law when a conveyance fails to satisfy all
102
four unities required for joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety.
For example, a joint tenant’s transfer of an interest in the property
103
would break the unity of title and create a tenancy-in-common.
Such unintentional formation may leave co-owners unaware that they
have created a tenancy-in-common and ignorant of the issues tenancy-in-common, co-ownership creates. Consequently, they would
not enter into a formal co-ownership agreement. Inheritance or de104
vise may also create a tenancy-in-common.
For example, a parent
may die, leaving property owned in severalty to her children, who
take the property as tenants-in-common. The heirs of such transfers
may not anticipate the problems that arise among tenants-in-common
or may lack the sophistication needed to consider such problems
and, therefore, they may not create a formal co-ownership arrangement.
101

Some close tenancies-in-common have very formal ownership structures. See,
e.g., BORDEN, supra note 11, at app. F (providing sample documents for close tenancies-in-common). Such formal structures generally attempt to comply with the IRS’s
guidance in Revenue Procedure 2002-22. See, e.g., id.; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-26005 (June 27, 2008) (applying Revenue Procedure 2002-22 but ruling that a twoperson tenancy-in-common is not a tax partnership even though the co-owners entered into buy-sell agreements, had the right to approve pledges of interests, entered
into indemnification agreements for non-pro rata share of loan guarantees, and
leased a portion of the property to a co-owner’s affiliate). Aspects of modern close
tenancies-in-common derive from the features found in open tenancies-in-common.
Such features are found in larger close tenancies-in-common formed by sophisticated
investors.
102
See Orth, supra note 30, in THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 30, at §
32.06. In some states, however, the focus is on the intent of parties at the time of
formation and whether they use specific words in the conveyance documents. See id.
The four unities are the unity of interest, title, time, and possession. See 2 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 180. Tenancies by the entirety also require the unity of
person based on marriage. See John V. Orth, Tenancies by the Entirety [hereinafter
Orth, Tenancies by the Entirety], in 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 30, §
33.06(b).
103
See John V. Orth, Joint Tenancies, in 4 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note
30, § 31.08(b).
104
See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.06(b)(2) (providing that most states now presume
that co-owned property, including property acquired by inheritance or device, is held
as a tenancy-in-common).
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Co-owners may create a tenancy-in-common by express limita105
tion, but such intentional formation does not necessarily ensure a
formal ownership structure. Many state statutes provide that conveyances of property to co-owners create tenancies-in-common, unless
106
Perhaps unaware of the significance
specifically stated otherwise.
of their co-ownership arrangements, friends or acquaintances who
acquire property as tenants-in-common may not seek a formal ownership structure. Others acquire property as husband and wife with
confidence and trust in each other’s capabilities and loyalty. Changes
in personal relationships or ownership of the property may alter the
107
nature of the tenancy-in-common ownership arrangement.
Business law commentators have recognized and considered the
lack of formality of close business arrangements. Forces that affect
the lack of formality in close business arrangements also appear to affect the lack of formality of close tenancies-in-common. Like close
tenancies-in-common, close business arrangements tend to be somewhat smaller and less complicated than open business arrangements
108
and tenancies-in-common.
The size of close business arrangements, in terms of invested capital, often does not justify the cost of
109
hiring legal counsel to help draft formal ownership documents.
The members of close business arrangements may not be sophisticated enough to recognize ex ante the need for planning and con110
tracting. Finally, the members of close business arrangements generally are acquainted with each other, trust each other, and do not
105

See id. § 32.06(b).
See id. § 32.06(b)(2).
107
For example, divorce would break the unity of person required for a tenancy
by the entirety and could render the arrangement either a joint tenancy or tenancyin-common, depending upon the applicable local law. See Orth, Tenancies by the Entirety, supra note 102, § 33.08(d). A spouse’s transfer of an interest in a joint tenancy
would break the unity of title and render the arrangement a tenancy-in-common. See
Orth, supra note 103, § 31.08(b).
108
See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 273 (1986) (Close business arrangements “tend to have
relatively few managers, who tend to be the largest residual claimants.”); Moll, supra
note 21, at 888–89 (identifying a small number of owners, absence of market for
ownership interests, owner participation in management, and owner relationships as
characteristics typical of close business arrangements).
109
See Dennis S. Karjala, Planning Problems in the Limited Liability Company, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 455, 477 (1995) (“Many small businesses . . . will elect not to assume
the expense of negotiating, and hiring an attorney to draft, a carefully worded operating agreement.”).
110
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1805 (2001) (recognizing that
failure to contract in close corporations often reflects “ignorance, lack of imagination, or poor legal advice”).
106
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foresee any potential dispute, or they prefer not to raise doubts about
mutual trust by broaching the idea of entering into formal agree111
As a result, they often do not create sophisticated ownerments.
ship arrangements. Similar factors would explain the lack of formal
112
agreements among many co-owners of close tenancies-in-common.
In contrast, open business arrangements tend to be larger, with
members from varying backgrounds who have no prior relationship
or acquaintance with each other. Those factors suggest the need for
greater structure in contractual arrangements, more available resources to consider and address issues raised by the structure, and
fewer impediments to prevent the members from creating formal
structures. The size of many open tenancies-in-common similarly
supports and justifies hiring legal counsel to draft sophisticated own113
The co-owners’
ership documents and consider state-law issues.
lack of mutual acquaintance motivates the co-owners to enter into
agreements that anticipate and address future events. The volume of
open tenancy-in-common arrangements allows legal advisors to improve structures as they handle multiple open tenancies-in-common
114
over an extended period of time. Advisors also become more familiar with open tenancies-in-common as they share their experiences
and ideas with each other informally, formally at conferences, and
111

See Manuel A. Utset, A Theory of Self-Control Problems and Incomplete Contracting:
The Case of Shareholder Contracts, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 1329, 1348 (2003)
(“[S]hareholders may opt not to adopt shareholder contracts because they choose to
rely on their mutual trustworthiness, and because proposing and bargaining over
these contracts can undermine the often fragile trust that exists at the beginning of
ventures.”).
112
The formation of a tenancy-in-common often may evidence the naivety of investors because sophisticated investors may prefer to acquire and own property in
some form of legal entity.
113
The IRS guidelines explicitly allow co-owners to enter into agreements that run
with the land. See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.04, 2002-1 C.B. 733. The co-ownership
agreement takes the place of the partnership agreement used in traditional, syndicated structures.
114
A few decades ago, one commentator recognized the need for accessible information about tenancies-in-common:
The purpose of this article is, therefore, two-fold: first, to assist busy
practicing lawyers in preparing cases involving the relative rights of cotenants where the amount involved does not make possible exhaustive
research; and second, to make some small contribution to an organization and rationalization of the law on the subject and the development
of a better body of law.
Dudley Weible, Accountability of Cotenants, 29 IOWA L. REV. 558, 558 (1944). Similar
phenomena helped standardize documentation and other common features of business arrangements. See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 253–56 (1984) (discussing the role of the transactional attorney in adding value to transactions).
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through published materials. Recognizing activity in the area, the
IRS also takes an interest and influences its development through
published guidance. As a consequence, the structures arguably become better, and the ideas and sophistication of the structures become more common and accessible to members of close tenancies-in115
Thus, the rise of open tenancies-incommon and their advisors.
common has helped expose issues prevalent with all tenancies-incommon, has formalized the features of open tenancies-in-common,
and has provided opportunities for addressing those issues and analyzing the features.
A. Ownership Features
The ownership features of open tenancies-in-common serve dual
purposes: they seek to comply with the IRS’s guidance and they address the co-owners’ lack of mutual acquaintance. The guidance includes several conditions that affect the ownership features of open
116
tenancies-in-common.
First, it provides that the co-owners must
hold the property as tenants-in-common, as defined ostensibly by
117
state law.
Nonetheless, some of the features in the guidance differ
significantly from features of traditional tenancies-in-common and
may alter the legal attributes of the arrangement. The conditions
limit co-owners’ use and management of the property and consequently appear to destroy the unity of possession, a fundamental cha118
racteristic of tenancies-in-common. Unity of possession grants each
119
co-owner the right to possess the whole property. Therefore, no coowner has the right to exclude the other co-owners from possession
or to solely possess any portion of the property, unless the other co120
owners do not contest such possession. Unity of possession also es115

As an example, sample documents for close tenancies-in-common are now
publicly available. See BORDEN, supra note 11, at app. F.
116
The conditions in the guidance arguably ensure that an arrangement is not a
tax partnership. Presumably the IRS would not challenge the classification of an arrangement that satisfies all of the conditions in the guidelines. They do not, however, necessarily comply with the federal definition of tax partnership. See Borden &
Keator, supra note 28, at 88–89. To err on the side of safety, most open tenancies-incommon comply with most of the conditions in the guidance, but deviate only when
they believe the law justifies such deviations. See id. at 89–96.
117
See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, §6.01, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (prohibiting ownership in a separate legal entity from holding title to the property as a whole).
118
See infra text accompanying notes 163–65 (discussing the restrictions on use
and management and how the restrictions might affect the unity of possession).
119
See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(a).
120
See Weible, supra note 114, at 558. Ousted co-owners may bring an ejectment
action to recover possession, and failing to do so may lead to lost title by adverse possession. See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(d).
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tablishes the parties’ claims to income from the property. For example, an ousted co-owner may bring an action under common law for
accounting to recover a share of the fair market rental value of the
121
The IRS’s guidance requires a different accounting
property.
122
method. Such requirements may destroy the unity of possession.
If the IRS’s guidance frustrates the unity of possession, open tenancies-in-common may be something other than tenancies-incommon under state law. State law classification is important for tax
purposes because the IRS’s guidance appears to require the ar123
If the corangement to be a tenancy-in-common under state law.
ownership arrangement disrupts the unity of possession, arguably the
arrangement would fail to satisfy that condition of the guidance.
Nonetheless, the IRS must anticipate that, to the extent its guidance
creates internal inconsistency, the published guidance must accommodate the IRS’s over-arching purpose, which is to provide guide124
lines for entity classification. Thus, if following the guidance results
in an entity that is not a tenancy-in-common under state law, the
guidance should disregard state-law classification. Otherwise, the IRS
could choose between the two alternatives to argue on audit for the
125
Thus, if the IRS’s guidance creates someposition that favors it.
thing that is not a state-law tenancy-in-common, open tenancies-incommon appear to represent arrangements that tax law classifies in126
dependently of state-law classification.
Regardless of the tax-law classification, state law must address the
classification and significance of open tenancies-in-common. Classification issues are generally derivative of other issues, such as liability
of members or management rights, which are the immediate issues in
127
state-law classification cases. For example, if the arrangement is not
121

See Weible, supra note 114, at 558.
See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.08, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (requiring the co-owners to
share revenue and expenses in proportion to their ownership interests in the property).
123
See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.01, 2002-1 C.B. 733.
124
See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 1, 2002-1 C.B. 733.
125
The tax consequences of tax classifications often are not apparent on the date
an arrangement comes into existence. See Borden, supra note 24, at 969–70. Depending upon the issue, the parties may prefer one classification above another. Id. at
957–70 (identifying the tax consequences of tax partnership classification). The
guidelines should provide some certainty to avoid such potentialities.
126
Tax law often disregards state law in determining whether an arrangement is a
tax partnership or tax corporation. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended
in 2006) (providing that arrangements that are not corporations under state law—
e.g., partnerships and limited liability companies—may elect to be tax corporations).
127
See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 2.02(a) (2007).
122
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128

a state-law tenancy-in-common, it could be a state-law partnership.
That could expose the co-owners to joint and several liability for the
other co-owners’ actions performed on behalf of the arrangement
129
and could also impose duties of loyalty and care on the co-owners.
Provisions in standard open tenancy-in-common ownership documents address some of those issues, but state-law classification may
raise unforeseen issues and consequences. Time will tell whether
state law respects the arrangement and the parties’ agreements and
treats them as tenancies-in-common or disregards the tax classification and treats the arrangements as state-law partnerships.
The IRS’s guidance generally allows no more than thirty-five
130
That limitation does
persons to join an open tenancy-in-common.
not reflect property law, nor does it find support in tax-entity classification; the IRS appears to have extracted that limitation from securities law. An interest in an open tenancy-in-common appears to be a
131
Therefore, sellers genersecurity under the Securities Act of 1933.
ally must register interests in open tenancies-in-common to sell
132
them.
Exemptions, in particular the private offering exemption,
permit the sale of unregistered securities, if the offering is limited to
128

See id. § 2.06(b).
See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT, §§ 306 and 404, 6 U.L.A 117 and 143 (2001) (describing
partner liability and standards of conduct).
130
See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.02, 2002-1 C.B. 733. The guidelines treat a husband
and wife as a single person for the thirty-five-owner limitation and treat all persons
who acquire interests in the property by inheritance as a single person. See id.
Therefore, the number of co-owners of an open tenancy-in-common could exceed
thirty-five actual persons without violating the thirty-five person rule.
131
Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities of Act of 1933 defines securities to include
“any . . . investment contract.” Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §
77b(a)(1) (2006). The Supreme Court held that the term “investment contract” includes interests in real property if investors acquired interests in the property as part
of “a common enterprise with the expectation that they would earn a profit solely
through the efforts of the promoter or of some one other than themselves.” SEC v.
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (holding that land sales contracts, warranty
deeds, and service contracts related to narrow strips of property in citrus groves were
investment contracts where investors, with no knowledge of managing such groves,
relied upon a management company for profit). Open tenancies-in-common grant
investors interests in property, include an ownership agreement and management
agreement, and allow the co-owners to rely upon managers to earn a profit. Therefore, interests in open tenancies-in-common appear to come within the securities law
definition of investment contract. A recent lawsuit seeks $2 billion damages from
promoters of open tenancies-in-common who did not register the interests as securities or seek to come within one of the registration exceptions. Complaint at 22,
Spann Trust v. DBSI Inc., No. CV OC 0820435 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2008). That
case could further clarify whether interests in open tenancies-in-common are securities.
132
See Securities Act of 1933, § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a)(1).
129
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133

no more than thirty-five purchasers.
Those exemptions appear to
be the source of the thirty-five-owner limitation. The thirty-five-owner
limitation does not reflect a tax principle, but it may evince sound
economic concepts in the absence of other mechanisms that would
protect investors from unscrupulous promoters.
As the number of co-owners increases, the actual control of any
co-owner would tend to decrease, assuming that co-owners have pro134
Diminution of control
portionate ownership in the arrangement.
would make the arrangement look more like a large publicly traded
135
company.
As control diminishes, investors become further removed from the management of the property. As a consequence,
they become less familiar with the management of the property and
have less access to information. To ensure that investors in open
business arrangements have access to information, securities laws require disclosure of information and registration of securities in ar136
rangements that will have more than thirty-five investors.
Distance from management in large companies justifies the thirty-five-person limit for exemption from the securities registration
rules, but the IRS’s guidance has other mechanisms for ensuring access to information. For example, because the guidance requires
unanimous consent of the co-owners for certain actions, including
137
hiring and retaining managers, the unanimous-consent requirement grants each owner, regardless of ownership interest, the power
to veto major actions. Managers’ need for annual approval of each
co-owner also helps ensure that the co-owners will acquire regular information about the mangers’ performance. Thus, diminution of

133

See Securities Act of 1933, § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 77d ; 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505(b)(2)(ii)
(as amended in 1992), 230.506(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 1989).
134
If a single co-owner had a super majority, diluting the ownership of the minority by spreading it among an increasing number of co-owners generally would not affect the control of the majority co-owner. Perhaps if the pre-dilution minority coowners generally favored the acts of the majority co-owner, dilution could, if nothing
else, create an annoyance for the majority co-owner.
135
See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 423 (5th Cir. 1981) (recognizing that
partners’ control diminishes as more partners join the partnership).
136
See supra text accompanying notes 131–33 (discussing the registration requirement and exemptions to it); see also CHARLES J. JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH
MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS § 7.06 (4th ed. 2008)
(discussing the history of the private placement exemption and the rationale for the
thirty-five-person limit).
137
See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.05, 2002-1 C.B. 733. Promoters, however, use options and other mechanisms to minimize the effect of such rules. See infra text accompanying notes 268–69.
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control and lack of investor information do not appear to be the ra138
tionale for the IRS’s thirty-five-person limitation.
The IRS’s thirty-five-person limitation appears to be arbitrary
from a tax perspective, but it may reflect a concern that more owners
will convert the arrangement to a tax partnership or tax corporation.
Unfortunately, that concern finds little support in tax theory. Partnership tax law and tax partnership classification are intended to fa139
The integration of property
cilitate tax accounting and reporting.
and services and the method for determining residual risk causes
140
complexities in tax accounting and reporting.
The number of
owners does not affect tax accounting and reporting. For example,
the accounting and reporting issues do not change if a piece of property managed by a third party is owned by ninety instead of thirty-five
persons. In either situation, if the manager provides only customary
tenant services for fair market value, the co-owners should generally
share revenue and expenses in proportion to their ownership inter141
ests, and the parties can trace income from resources they own.
Therefore, the thirty-five person limitation remains an inexplicable
aspect of open tenancies-in-common.
The IRS’s guidance also prohibits co-owners from doing things
that would evince an intent to form an arrangement that is a legal en142
The definition of partnership aptity separate from its members.
pears to provide that parties who hold themselves out as partners or
members of another form of business entity, such as a limited liability company, should be estopped from taking a tax position that the
138

If the unanimous-consent rule vests owners with too much control, the interests may not be securities under the 1933 Securities Act. See Williamson, 645 F.2d at
421–23. Furthermore, if the owners must rely upon specialized skills or knowledge
or a manager, they may not have control that is sufficient to overcome the investment contract test. See id. at 423–24 (“[A] partnership can be an investment contract
only when the partners are so dependent on a particular manager that they cannot
replace him or otherwise exercise ultimate control.”).
139
See H.R. REP. NO. 72-708, at 53 (1932) (providing that the Congress enacted a
statutory definition of tax partnership to “make it easier for the members to determine the distributive shares in the [partnership] gains and losses which are to be included in their returns”); Borden, supra note 24, at 941–57.
140
See Bradley T. Borden, Residual-Risk Model for Classifying Business Arrangements,
37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010),, available at ssrn.com/paper=1365933.
141
See infra text accompanying notes 145–49.
142
See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.03, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (prohibiting the co-ownership
arrangement from (1) filing a partnership or corporate tax return; (2) conducting
business under a common name; (3) executing an agreement that identifies the coowners as partners, shareholders, or members of a separate business entity; and (4)
holding themselves out as some form of business entity). The prohibited activities
are those that evidence a subjective intent to form a partnership. See BROMBERG &
RIBSTEIN, supra note 127, § 2.05(b).
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arrangement is anything other than what the intent manifests.
Thus, the restriction is consistent with the current definition of tax
144
partnership, which adopts both an estoppel and an intent test.
That does not, however, mean that tax theory supports the IRS’s
guidance on this issue.
The economic theory of tax partnership would reject the thirtyfive person limit and the intent restriction, however, if the owners do
not have an ownership interest in any services that generate in145
come.
Under the economic theory of tax partnerships, a tax partnership should exist only if the parties are unable to trace income
146
from co-owned resources. Tenancies-in-common, as a general rule,
grant the owners of the respective interests in the property rights to
income from the property in proportion to their ownership inter147
Thus, the co-owners are able to trace income from the propests.
erty based on their respective ownership interests in the property.
Such simple arrangements do not need the complex rules that apply
to tax partnerships and tax corporations, nor should they be allowed
148
access to them.
Intent is not relevant if the parties do not share
ownership and control of both property and services. The number of
owners an arrangement has does not change that conclusion. The
thirty-five person limit remains inexplicable. Even though economic
theory does not support the intent test, the IRS’s adoption of the intent test is consistent with the current definition of tax partnership
149
An adherence
and the state-law definition of tenancy-in-common.
to those rules explains the IRS’s adoption of the intent test.
143

See Maletis v. United States, 200 F.2d 97, 97–98 (9th Cir. 1952) (using estoppel
to hold that an arrangement is a tax partnership).
144
See Borden, supra note 24, at 980–82 (concluding that the courts have derived
an intent test from the substantive-law definition of partnership); id. at 1000–01 (describing the estoppel test). But see Lewis v. Comm’r, 23 T.C. 538, 550 (1954); Lulu
Lung Powell v. Comm’r, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 161 (1967) (holding that an arrangement
that filed a partnership tax return was not a tax partnership).
145
See Borden, supra note 140.
146
See Bradley T. Borden, Aggregate-Plus Theory of Partnership Taxation, 43 GA. L.
REV. (forthcoming May 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121351.
147
Enforcing such rights may be difficult because of the application of the various
remedies, which include actions for waste, contribution, account, and ejectment. See
Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07. See generally Weible, supra note 114.
148
See Borden, supra note 24, at 951–56.
149
The IRS generally will not consider whether a co-ownership arrangement is a
tax partnership if immediately before its creation the co-owners held the property
through a partnership or corporation. See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.03, 2002-1 C.B.
733. This provision reflects the IRS’s long-standing position that a distribution of
property to members of a business arrangement immediately prior to an exchange
should disqualify the exchange from section 1031 treatment. See Rev. Rul. 77-337,
1977-2 C.B. 305. However, the IRS has been unsuccessful in presenting that position
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The IRS’s guidance requires co-owners to share indebtedness secured by a blanket lien on the property in proportion to their undi150
vided interests in the property.
To the extent a blanket lien is a
nonrecourse loan, the nature of the indebtedness will ensure that the
151
co-owners share the indebtedness proportionately.
Possibilities of
disproportionate sharing of debt arise when the indebtedness is recourse. In such situations, if the co-owners are jointly and severally
liable for the indebtedness, they may agree among themselves to use
indemnification provisions or other agreements to disproportionately
allocate the indebtedness. The co-owners may change a liability that
would otherwise be nonrecourse into a recourse liability if one or
more co-owners guarantees all or a portion of the liability. Such arrangements would violate the IRS’s guidance, but disproportionate
sharing of blanket-lien indebtedness does not appear to be inconsis152
tent with the common law tax definition of a tenancy-in-common.
Furthermore, proportionate sharing of blanket-lien indebtedness
may make investing in such arrangements unattractive for some
153
property owners.
The IRS’s unfavorable view of disproportionate sharing of blanket-lien indebtedness may derive from a common practice among
to courts. See, e.g., Bolker v. Comm’r, 760 F.2d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 1985) (granting
section 1031 nonrecognition to an exchange of property occurring immediately after
a corporation distributed it to the exchanger); Mason v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH)
1134 (1988) (holding that an exchange of undivided interests received from a partnership could qualify for section 1031 nonrecognition). Thus, the IRS’s position
finds little support in case law.
150
See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.09, 2002-1 C.B. 733. The IRS defines “blanket lien”
as “any mortgage or trust deed that is recorded against the [p]roperty as a whole.”
Id. § 4.
151
The holder of nonrecourse indebtedness has recourse only against the property securing it. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1083 (8th ed. 2004). Any blanket nonrecourse loan would be secured by the property as a whole, and if the lender proceeded against the property to collect the loan, it would affect each co-owner in
proportion to the interests in the property they hold.
152
See Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 93. The prohibition of disproportionate
sharing of blanket-lien indebtedness also appears to violate equity. See id. (providing
an example of inequity the prohibition creates).
153
Investors often have different levels of comfort regarding leverage. Some may
be more comfortable with larger levels of indebtedness, whereas others may need a
specific level of indebtedness to preserve nonrecognition for their exchange. Section 1031(d) provides that liability discharged as part of an exchange is taxable boot.
I.R.C. § 1031(d) (2006). If, however, the exchanger requires replacement property
subject to the same amount of liability that was discharged, the discharged liability
will not be taxable as boot. See Treas. Reg. §1.1031(d)-2, ex. 2 (1956). Thus, if an
exchanger’s proportionate share of the blanket-lien indebtedness is insufficient to
cover the discharged liability, the exchanger must find a way to compensate for the
difference.
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partners: specially allocating partnership liability, which allows part154
Disproporners to disproportionately share partnership liability.
tionate sharing of liability is not unique to partnerships, however.
Common law allows tenants in common to disproportionately share
blanket-lien indebtedness by entering into indemnification agreements or by guaranteeing blanket-lien indebtedness. Disproportionately sharing blanket-lien indebtedness should not be deemed to be
155
The prohibition
an activity that would create a tax partnership.
against blanket-lien indebtedness also encourages co-owners individually borrowing against their own interests. By borrowing individually against their respective interests, co-owners can obtain a debt
structure that would mirror an arrangement with disproportionate
156
sharing of blanket-lien indebtedness. The IRS prohibition thus appears to do nothing other than cause unneeded complexities. Consequently, lawyers do not hesitate to counsel investors that the disproportionate sharing of blanket-lien indebtedness should not
157
frustrate the tenancy-in-common classification.
Without a doubt, the IRS’s guidance significantly influences the
ownership features of open tenancies-in-common. However, several
of the ownership features lack support in tax law and economic theory. The features could place members of open tenancies-incommon at a competitive disadvantage in the market. The IRS
should consider revising its guidance to comply more closely with tax
and economic theory. In particular, it should remove both the thirtyfive person limit and the prohibition against disproportionate sharing
of blanket-lien indebtedness. It should also consider whether the in154

See I.R.C. § 752 (treating changes in a partner’s share of partnership liability as
partner contributions or distributions to the partner); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3) (as
amended in 2006) (listing items to consider in determining a partner’s obligation for
partnership liabilities.).
155
Tax practitioners recognize that the IRS’s guidance on this issue deviates from
the definition of tax partnership. Consequently, they will write tax opinion letters
stating that co-ownership arrangements with disproportionate sharing of blanket-lien
indebtedness are more likely than not tenancies-in-common for tax purposes. See
Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 93. Many persons who invest in open tenanciesin-common use section 1031 exchange proceeds to acquire their interests. Section
1031 requires parties to offset liability on relinquished property with liability on replacement property. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(d)-2, ex. (2) (1956). Generally, the
parties acquiring interests in open tenancies-in-common will need different liabilityto-investment ratios on their acquired tenancy-in-common interests to accurately offset the liability they had on replacement property. See Borden & Keator, supra note
28, at 93.
156
See Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 93 (providing examples of arrangements that subject co-owners to similar liability with respect to their interests in
property, even though one arrangement has blanket-lien indebtedness).
157
See id.

BORDEN (FINAL)

414

4/6/2009 10:53:08 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:387

tent test is necessary and whether the co-owners should be allowed to
own the property through legal entities in addition to statutory trusts.
Finally, it should focus on rules that ensure the separate ownership of
the property and services. The guidance should prohibit property
owners from providing services and prohibit service providers from
owning an interest in the property. Those modifications would help
the guidance comply with existing tax law and theory and ease the
economic difficulties the guidance causes.
B. Management Features
Investors often buy interests in open tenancies-in-common to re158
lieve themselves of management responsibilities. They delegate the
management responsibilities to professional property managers.
Therefore, the arrangement must provide for the management of the
property, orderly distribution of the property’s income, and sharing
of expenses. The IRS’s guidance specifically addresses many management aspects of open tenancies-in-common. Co-owners and managers structure their arrangements with the IRS’s guidance in mind,
but also must incorporate other legal and economic concepts into
their agreements.
A significant part of the IRS’s guidance is the unanimous consent requirement. This guidance requires the co-owners to approve
unanimously: (1) the hiring of managers; (2) any disposition of the
property; (3) leases of any portion of the property; and (4) any action
159
The IRS’s unanimous-consent requirerelated to a blanket lien.
ment for disposing of the property and borrowing against the property as a whole reflects the concept of concurrent ownership, namely
that each co-owner has an undivided interest in the property that is
160
Consequently, a single co-owner cannot unilaterfreely alienable.
ally sell the entire property or offer the entire property as collateral
for a loan. Instead, single co-owners can act according to their respective interests and may unilaterally sell those interests or offer

158

See supra text accompanying note 7.
Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.05, 2002-1 C.B. 733. The IRS’s guidance allows coowners to agree to be bound by the majority vote of the undivided interests or any
other action. Id. The IRS’s guidance prohibits co-owners from granting another
person a global power of attorney to act on behalf of the co-owner, but co-owners
may grant a specific power of attorney to allow someone else to carry out actions that
the co-owners have approved. Id.
160
See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.02 (“Each tenant in common possesses an interest
in the concurrent estate that is alienable, devisable, and inheritable.”).
159
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161

them as collateral for personal loans.
A creditor who forecloses on
an undivided interest in property takes the rights the debtor-co-owner
had, and a purchaser of such an interest subrogates the rights the
162
By negative inference, others cannot sell or
seller-co-owner had.
encumber another co-owner’s interest without the co-owner’s consent. Therefore, the IRS’s unanimous-consent requirement appears
to focus on preserving a fundamental feature of traditional tenanciesin-common.
The unanimous-consent requirement nullifies aspects of unity of
possession. Under common law, all tenants in common have the
163
The right to possess the property
right to possess the property.
vests the co-owners with power to lease unilaterally their rights to any
person, which would vest the lessee with the right to possess the
property, but not to prohibit other co-owners from taking posses164
sion.
The majority of states requires the co-owners to share rents
165
and profits received from non-co-owners with the other co-owners.
These common law rules demonstrate that a single co-owner may
lease the property to a third party by leasing an undivided interest in
the property. The IRS’s requirement that co-owners must unanimously approve leases of any portion of the property appears to override the common law right to lease an undivided interest in the
property and vest the lessee with the right of possession. Thus, the
unanimous consent requirement distinguishes open tenancies-incommon from unstructured close tenancies-in-common.
The IRS’s unanimous-consent requirement for hiring a manager
also appears to be inconsistent with the common-law definition of tenancy-in-common. A co-owner’s unilateral right to hire managers is
implicit in the co-owners’ actions for contribution or accounting under common law. The common law actions for accounting and contribution help establish that co-owners may unilaterally hire managers
in tenancies-in-common governed by common law. Common law allows any co-owner to improve the property, but a co-owner who improves the property has an action for contribution against the other
co-owners only if the other co-owners agreed to be liable for a share
161

See id. § 32.07(e) (recognizing that each co-owner has an interest in the property to which a creditor may attach a security interest).
162
See id. (providing that a creditor who acquires a debtor co-owner’s interest has
no rights greater than the debtor co-owner had).
163
See id. § 32.07(d); Weible, supra note 114, at 558.
164
See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(d).
165
See Weible, supra note 114, at 559–62 (discussing the laws that govern rentsharing in situations where a co-owner is in sole possession and a third party is in
possession of the property).
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166

of the improvement costs.
The co-owner who improves property
can recover the costs in an accounting for rents and profits collected
from non-co-owners only to the extent the improvements increase
167
If the property can be conveniently divided, the imthe rents.
prover will take the improved portion in an in-kind partition action;
otherwise, the improver will be awarded any increase in value from
168
A cothe improvements in a partition by sale and distribution.
owner who repairs the property has no right of contribution for the
repairs unless the nonrepairing co-owners agreed to be liable for the
169
costs of repairs or the repairs are necessary to preserve the estate.
The rules relating to actions for contribution and accounting
indicate that a co-owner may improve or repair property or hire others to perform the repairs or improvements. Co-owners would not
have to resort to actions for contribution or accounting if they had
170
The remedies are therefore
agreed to improvements or repairs.
available only when a co-owner acts unilaterally. The IRS’s unanimous-approval requirement thus modifies the rights generally possessed by tenants in common to manage the property and hire man-

166

See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(b) (“[A] cotenant cannot be compelled to contribute to the expenses of improvement, lest the costs reduce, or even destroy, the
unrealized value of the undivided share.”).
As a general proposition in the absence of an express or implied
agreement to pay for improvements, a cotenant may not charge the
property of his cotenant with contribution for the cost of improvements. Otherwise stated, the rule is that there is no recovery at law for
improvements and whatever relief a cotenant may secure must be in
equity.
Weible, supra note 114, at 577 (citations omitted).
167
Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(b) (“[I]ncreased income attributable to the improvement should be allocated to the improver.”). Because any doubts about the increased income will be decided against the improver, prudence suggests a co-owner
should obtain an agreement from other co-owners before making the improvements.
See id.
168
See id. The right to partition provides any dissatisfied co-owner a remedy if the
action of contribution does not provide the desired outcome, so the rules do not attempt to make an improver whole. See id.
169
See id. The rationale for enforcing contribution for the cost of necessary repairs is that an action for waste is available to enforce the duty to make such repairs,
and necessary repairs to do not improve a co-owner out of an estate. See id. Public
policy may not, however, discourage permissive waste, so courts could deny both the
action for waste and the action for contribution; thus, leaving dissatisfied co-owners
with the action of partition to deal with perceived or actual harms. See id. The repairing partner may recover the costs through adjustments made in a partition or in
an accounting action. See id. (referring to costs of improvements, but similar rules
should apply to costs of repairs because actions for accounting should recognize outlays made by the repairer).
170
See supra text accompanying note 166.
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agers unilaterally. This is another example of how open tenancies-incommon differ from unstructured close tenancies-in-common. It also
illustrates the IRS’s disregard for state-law tenancies-in-common. Although common law does not appear to prohibit unanimous consent
for hiring property managers, it does not require such consent.
The IRS’s basis for requiring unanimous consent for certain actions is unclear. This deviation from common law indicates the IRS is
not merely concerned in ensuring that open tenancies-in-common
retain common law features of tenancies-in-common. The unanimous-consent requirements may derive from the centralized man171
Before the
agement characteristic of obsolete classification rules.
Treasury promulgated the check-the-box regulations in 1997, tax law
classified tax partnerships and tax corporations using entity charac172
teristics. One of those characteristics was centralized management,
which delegates owners’ decision-making authority to managers, who
173
may not be owners.
The characteristics traditionally distinguished
tax partnerships and tax trusts from tax corporations; they did not
174
distinguish tax partnerships from tax tenancies-in-common.
Entity classification rules abandoned a centralized management
requirement when the Treasury promulgated a formalistic elective
175
The IRS appears to have revivified the cenclassification regime.
tralized-management characteristic in its tenancy-in-common guidance, which distinguishes tax partnerships from tenancies-incommon. The irony is that centralized management does not appear
to be a characteristic used to distinguish tenancies-in-common from
176
tax partnerships.
Thus, in revivifying the centralized-arrangement
characteristic, the IRS applies it to a new classification issue. Its application appears tenuous, however, because it disallows arrange-

171

Earlier income tax regulations listed several characteristics that the Treasury
considered common to entities and that distinguished entities from arrangements
that are aggregates of their owners. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960)
(listing the following as characteristics of entities: (1) associates; (2) an objective to
carry on business and divide the gains therefrom; (3) continuity of life; (4) centralization of management; (5) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property;
and (6) free transferability of interests).
172
See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, -2(a)(2), -2(a)(3) (1960).
173
See id. § 301.7701-2(c).
174
See id. §§ 301.7701-1, -2(a)(2), -2(a)(3).
175
See id. § 301.7701-3(a) (as amended in 2006) (providing that any business entity that is not a tax corporation is a tax partnership, unless it elects to be a tax corporation). A tax corporation is defined generally as any arrangement incorporated under state law. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) (as amended in 2008).
176
See Borden, supra note 24, at 975–1001 (listing the tests used to distinguish tax
partnerships from tenancies-in-common and other disregarded arrangements).
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ments to do that which the common law allows in tenancies-incommon, which would not generally affect their tax classification.
The IRS has relaxed its unanimous-consent requirement somewhat, apparently in reaction to market demands. Many open tenancy-in-common co-owners may have no interest in the management
of the property and would prefer to defer to others for decisions
about hiring managers, leasing the property, or financing the property’s maintenance and improvement. Requiring unanimous consent
for all actions thus frustrates the objectives of investors who wish to
have a passive investment. It also causes administrative difficulties
because those who lack the interest may not take the time to vote or
may simply disregard notice of pending notes. Realizing that many
investors, even in open tenancies-in-common, prefer little or no involvement, the IRS has ruled privately that co-owners may provide si177
As
lent consent after receiving written notice of certain actions.
modified by the private ruling, the IRS’s guidance moves a step closer
to allowing centralized management and adhering to traditional aspects of tenancies-in-common. Centralized management is a com178
mon feature of open business arrangements, and the IRS’s move in
that direction reflects an understanding of market realities. As long
as the managers are paid a fair market rate for their services, the
manner in which they are hired or retained should not affect the
179
classification of an arrangement. The IRS could move further to allow centralized management.
177

I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2003-27-003 (ruling that a co-owner satisfies the consent
requirement by not replying to a proposed action within a certain time period).
Open tenancies-in-common use provisions such as the following in co-ownership
agreements to facilitate the consent requirement and allow for passive investment:
Whenever in this Agreement the consent or approval of the Tenants in
Common is required or otherwise requested with respect to any decision, each Tenant in Common shall have a period of time (the “Approval Period”) ending on the date that is seven days after the date the
request for such consent or approval is given in which to give written
notice of its approval or disapproval of such decision. Each Tenant in
Common agrees to use its best efforts to timely respond to any request
for consent or approval. If a Tenant in Common does not give written
notice of its disapproval of such decision with the Approval Period,
such inaction shall constitute approval of such decision by the Tenant
in Common.
Borden & Keator, supra note 28, at 90.
178
See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26
J. L. & ECON. 301, 308–09 (1983) (presenting an economic theory for separation of
ownership—referred to by Fama and Jensen as residual claims—and management,
referred to as decision control, in larger business arrangements).
179
See supra text accompanying notes 145–49 (discussing the theory of partnership
tax and significance of integrating services and property in classification).
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The IRS’s guidance also limits the type of activities that a coowner may perform with respect to the property. Under the guid180
ance, a co-owner may perform only customary rental services. This
allowance deviates from the definition of a tax partnership, which
provides that if a partner contributes services to a co-ownership ar181
rangement, the arrangement will be a tax partnership. Partnership
tax law exists to facilitate tax administration and simplify tax account182
ing and reporting.
Arrangements become complicated and need
partnership tax account and reporting rules when parties contribute
183
property and services to a common business venture.
In such arrangements, the parties take an interest in all contributed resources
and cannot accurately identify the source of income they receive
184
The income may be from contributed
from the arrangement.
property or contributed services, resources in which all members
have an interest. The inability to trace income requires tax account185
ing rules that deviate from the assignment-of-income doctrine.
Thus, instead of looking to the source of income, the law looks to allocation provisions to determine the members’ shares of income
186
Partnership and corfrom arrangements that integrate resources.
180

Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.11 2002-1 C.B. 733 (“The co-owners’ activities must be
limited to those customarily performed in connection with the maintenance and repair of rental property customary activities.” (citing Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B.
261). The IRS’s guidance generally imputes to the co-owners activities performed by
parties related to the co-owners and the co-owners’ agents. See id. (disregarding activities of a co-owner who holds an interest in the property for less than six months).
181
The definition of tax partnership distinguishes between the type of service an
arrangement provides and the source of the service. See Borden, supra note 24, at
992–98. An arrangement is not a partnership if a manager receiving fair management fees provides only customary tenant services with respect to the property. See
Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. at 261. If a co-owner provides the same services, the arrangement is probably a tax partnership. See Cusik v. Comm’r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH)
241, 243 (1998).
182
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
183
See Borden, supra note 146.
184
See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organizations, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972) (suggesting that parties integrate resources to increase output and to help monitor behavior); Borden, supra
note 140 (discussing the accounting difficulty integration creates); Benjamin Klein,
Robert G. Crawford & Armen Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297, 308–24 (1978) (providing examples of resource integration).
185
See Borden, supra note 24, at 951–56 (describing the inability to apply the assignment-of-income doctrine to arrangements that integrate property and services or
services of multiple parties); Darryll K. Jones, Toward Equity and Efficiency in Partnership Allocations, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1047, 1070–71 (2006) (recognizing the relationship
between the assignment-of-income doctrine and the partnership allocation rules).
186
See Borden, supra note 140.
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porate tax rules address difficulties raised by integrating property and
187
In the case of tenancies-in-common, the classification
services.
question should be whether the arrangement needs the partnership
tax accounting and reporting rules.
By allowing co-owners to provide customary tenant services, the
IRS’s guidance ignores partnership tax theory and the definition of
tax partnership. If a co-owner provides customary tenant services, the
co-owners can no longer trace income from its sources and must use
allocation rules to determine the co-owners’ shares of the arrange188
By allowing such activities, the IRS’s guidance apment’s income.
pears to misinterpret existing laws that permit co-owners to pay third189
party managers market value to provide customary tenant services.
That allowance does not frustrate the parties’ ability to trace income
190
from its source. If parties to an arrangement are able to accurately
trace income from the contributed resource to the contributor, the
191
arrangement does not need the partnership tax rules. Instead, the
arrangement should allocate income to parties based upon the resources they own. As owners of the property, the co-owners can have
income only from the property, and the service provider can have in192
Allowing the co-owners to provide cuscome only from services.
tomary tenant services would frustrate the ability to trace income
from its source.
The ability to trace income from property to the owners of
property justifies disregarding tenancies-in-common for tax purposes.
Each co-owner has an interest in property and, as a general rule, is
193
entitled to a proportionate share of income from the property. Be187

See id. (discussing the current tax classification rules and how they should distinguish between different business arrangements, even though they may fall short
under the current regime).
188
See id.
189
See Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261 (ruling that a co-ownership arrangement
was not a tax partnership even though the co-owners paid a manager fair market value to provide customary tenant services).
190
Service providers can trace income from their services and property owners
can trace income from the property they own, so they do not need allocation rules.
See Borden, supra note 140.
191
See Borden, supra note 140.
192
See Borden, supra note 140 (using an example of an apartment owner and
manager to describe the ability to allocate income from its source in the case of arrangements where parties retain the unitary residual risk of the respective resources).
193
See infra text accompanying notes 221–29 (describing the rights a tenant-incommon generally has in property). The general rule is that each co-owner is entitled to a proportionate share of the property’s income, even though parties may have
the right to offset for expenses incurred in maintaining the property and may not be
made whole until they dispose of the property.
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cause the parties can trace income directly from their interests in the
property, they do not need the partnership tax accounting and reporting rules, and those rules should be off limits to such arrange194
Thus, the guidance should prohibit the co-owners from
ments.
providing any service with respect to the property, but allow them to
hire a third party to provide customary tenant services for fair market
compensation. It disregards tax law by allowing co-owners to provide
customary tenant services.
Co-owners of open tenancies-in-common generally hire a third
195
party to manage the property. The IRS’s guidance permits any per196
The IRS, however,
son other than lessees to manage the property.
limits the manner in which the co-owners may compensate the manager; specifically, the IRS’s guidance prohibits the manager from
197
This rule apparsharing in the profits or income of the property.
ently derives from the joint-profit test of the definition of tax partner198
ship.
Apparently, the IRS is concerned that if a manager performs
the services for a percentage of the profits or income of the arrange199
ment, the manager could be deemed to be a partner.
Several
courts have, however, found that a tax partnership does not exist,
200
even though a service provider shares profits with property owners.
Thus, profit sharing alone does not establish that an arrangement is a

194

See Bradley T. Borden, Policy and Theoretical Dimensions of Qualified Tax Partnerships, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 317, 367–68 (2008) (reasoning that access to the partnership
tax accounting and reporting rules should not be elective).
195
See supra text accompanying note 7 (recognizing that co-owners of open tenancies-in-common seek to relieve themselves of the three Ts of property ownership).
196
See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.12, 2002-1 C.B. 733. The IRS’s guidance provides
that co-owners may hire a co-owner or any party related to the co-owner to manage
the property, but to be consistent with the other condition, the IRS must anticipate
that any services a co-owner (or party related to the co-owner) provides will be limited to allowed customary tenant services. Id. The IRS’s guidance also permits the
manager to maintain a common bank account but requires the manager to disburse
funds within three months after receiving them. See id.
197
See id. (requiring further that the fee paid to a manager not exceed the fair
market value for the manager’s services).
198
See Borden, supra note 24, at 984–91 (describing the joint-profit test as a test
that excludes from the definition of tax partnership arrangements that lack a join
profit motive).
199
See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 2, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (citing Bergford v. Comm’r, 12 F.3d
166 (9th Cir. 1993) and the manager’s share of profits as authority for tax partnership treatment of arrangements with profit-sharing).
200
See, e.g., Luna v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1078–79 (1964) (holding that a profitsharing arrangement between an insurance agent and the insurance company was
not a tax partnership); Copeland v. Ratterree, No. 5215, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4556,
at *13 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 1957) (holding that control, not profit-sharing, is important
in determining whether an arrangement is a tax partnership).
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tax partnership. If the compensation paid to the manager reflects
fair market value, its dependence on profits should not matter in de201
termining what the manager owns. The IRS thus adds a restriction
that is not found in the common law definition of tax partnership.
Perhaps the IRS erred on the side of caution in prohibiting profit
sharing with managers, but its rule has significant economic ramifications.
Often, ownership and management are combined in close business arrangements but are separated in open business arrange202
ments.
Parties separate ownership and control to obtain the bene203
fits of specialized capital allocation and specialized management.
Owners will often share profits with managers or grant them an ownership interest to reduce agency costs and to help ensure that their
204
The IRS’s guidance allows co-owners to
divergent interests align.
grant ownership interests to a manager who provides only customary
205
tenant services, but forbids profit sharing.
Thus, the guidance violates the tax definition of tenancy-in-common and prohibits the use
of profit sharing to align the interests of owners and managers. If
managers do not have an ownership interest, the anticipated consequence of the profit-sharing restriction interest is that managers will
201

See Stanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 694–95 (1986).
202
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 228–29 (providing that a common feature of close corporations is that principal investors often manage the corporation). Describing the differences between control features in a large public corporation and a closely held corporation, Professor Moll states:
In the traditional public corporation, the shareholder is normally a detached investor who neither contributes labor to the corporation nor
takes part in management responsibilities. In contrast, within a close
corporation, a more intimate and intense relationship exists between
capital and labor. Close corporation shareholders usually expect employment and a meaningful role in management, as well as a return on
the money paid for [their] shares.
Moll, supra note 21, at 888 (citations and quotations omitted).
203
See Fama & Jensen, supra note 178, at 312 (“[S]ince decision skills are not a necessary consequence of wealth or willingness to bear risk, the specialization of decision management and residual risk bearing allowed by unrestricted common stock
enhances the adaptability of a complex organization to changes in the economic environment.”).
204
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 232–33 (“Compensation agreements link changes in managers’ wealth to performance of the firm, which reduces
though it cannot eliminate the divergence of interest implied by the separation of
management and risk bearing.”); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
323 (1976) (recognizing that firms use compensation to help reduce agency costs).
205
Rev. Proc. 2002-22, §§ 6.11, 6.12, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (allowing co-owners to provide customary tenant services, but prohibiting profit sharing with managers).
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act in their own self-interest to the detriment of the owners. Indeed,
a recent lawsuit brought against the promoters of several open tenancies-in-common suggests that managers may have followed that pre206
dictable course.
If the co-owners cannot use traditional mechanisms such as
shared ownership or profit sharing, government regulation should
help align parties’ interests. Fortuitously, securities regulation helps
207
Stringent penalties under
fill the gap the IRS’s guidance creates.
the securities laws help motivate promoters to disclose their performance with respect to other properties they manage and to disclose all
208
Such disclosure
information about the property in the offering.
provides information that will likely influence investor behavior. For
example, prior mismanagement will destroy a promoter’s reputation
209
Disclosing
and make capital more expensive in future offerings.
prior performance would therefore appear to dissuade investment.
Thus, the securities laws help compensate for an apparent deficiency
in the IRS guidance. With no indication from the IRS that this was its
intent, the gap filling appears to be a coincidence.

206

See generally Complaint, Spann Trust v. DBSI Inc., No. CV OC 0820435 (Idaho
Dist. Ct. Oct. 27, 2008) (alleging that the promoters of nonsecuritized open tenancies-in-common committed several counts of fraud regarding various aspects of the
offering and property).
207
The application of securities laws appears fortuitous because, apparently, no
evidence exists to suggest that the IRS contemplated the applicability of the securities
laws.
208
For example, federal securities laws allow a person to rescind a purchase, if the
seller used untrue statements of material facts or omits material facts in an offering.
Any person who offers or sells a security [through communication],
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state
a material fact . . . , shall be liable . . . to the person purchasing such security from him, who may sue . . . to recover the consideration paid for
such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he
no longer owns the security.
Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (2000).
209
Judge Easterbrook and Professor Fischel recognize the efficiency of capital
markets, which should apply similarly to other markets, such as the open tenancy-incommon market.
Few markets are as efficient as capital markets. Poor performance
leads the markets to respond in ways that bring the costs home to the
mangers. First, investors (both informed and uninformed) will pay less
for shares. The more investors believe that their dollars will be used by
those in control of firms in ways inconsistent with maximizing the value
of the firm, the less they will pay for shares. To minimize this rational
fear, those in control have incentives to adopt governance mechanisms
that limit their discretion to benefit at the investors’ expense.
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 96.
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The IRS’s guidance also prohibits a lessee from paying rent as a
percent of income or profits derived by any person from the prop210
erty.
This prohibition apparently derives from the joint-profit test
211
of tax partnership classification. However, the joint-profit test does
not definitively answer whether an arrangement is a tax partner212
ship, so the IRS’s absolute prohibition is not consistent with the definition of tax partnership. The prohibition also limits the types of
arrangements that co-owners may use to reduce lessee opportunistic
behavior. The inability to share tenant income may place members
of open tenancies-in-common at a disadvantage in the market.
Property owners and tenants commonly use revenue-sharing arrangements to automatically adjust rent payments to reflect changes
in the market and to share the risks of owning and using the prop213
For example, if the tenant’s business improves, the rental
erty.
agreement may provide that the co-owner will receive more rent.
The lease also could provide for reduced rental payments if business
slows down. The reason for such provisions in leases is that a tenant’s
income is often both a function of the tenant’s efforts and the property. Without such mechanisms, members of tenancies-in-common
may be unable to attract some tenants in periods of escalating rents
and may witness greater rental delinquencies in periods of declining
rents. Although the IRS’s guidance does not prohibit co-owners to
determine rent as a percentage of revenue, determining whether an

210

Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.13, 2002-1 C.B. 733. Leasing arrangements must be
bona fide leases for federal tax purposes and must reflect the fair market value for
the use of the property. Id. The amount of rent may depend upon a fixed percentage of receipts or sales, but it may not depend upon “net income from the
[p]roperty, cash flow, increases in equity, or similar arrangements.” Id.
211
See Borden, supra note 24, at 984–91 (describing the use of the joint-profit
test); supra text accompanying notes 197–201 (discussing the joint-profit test and the
IRS prohibition of profit-sharing with managers).
212
See Luna v. Comm’r, 42 T.C. 1067, 1078–79 (1964); Copeland v. Ratterree, No.
5215, 1957 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4556, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. 1957).
213
See Harlan E. Moore Charitable Trust v. United States, 9 F.3d 623, 625 (7th Cir.
1993) (“Leases that no one would doubt were bona fide involve some, and sometimes considerable, sharing of business risks between landlord and tenant to their
mutual benefit.”).
[Percentage rent] is common, economists conjecture, in part because
it shares with partnerships the agreeable feature of risk sharing, . . .
(this as we said is a common function of leases and does not transform
them into partnerships), in part because it reduces the cash-flow demands of the tenant (so it is a form of lending by landlord to tenant).
Id. at 626; WILLIAM B. BRUEGGEMAN & JEFFREY D. FISHER, REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND
INVESTMENTS 258–61 (13th ed. 2008) (describing various methods, including percentage rent, that parties use to determine rents).
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arrangement is a revenue-sharing arrangement and not a profit214
sharing arrangement may be difficult.
The master-lease structure provides an opportunity for coowners to allow others to share in increased rental income, without
215
Under such a structure, the promoter
sharing profits or income.
forms an affiliated entity (a master tenant) to lease the property from
216
the co-owners.
If the rents increase, the master tenant may pay a
217
rental bonus to the co-owners. If the rent decreases below the costs
of managing the property the master tenant will become insolvent
218
and stop making rental payments to the co-owners. Such structures
allow the tenants to share in the upside of rental increases and to
bear the risk of market downturns. Furthermore, the IRS guidelines
do not appear to restrict the master tenant’s sharing of profits with
subtenants. Thus, although a master-lease structure may not be a
pure profit-sharing arrangement with the co-owners, it does allow
them to share in the arrangement’s financial performance with others. Such arrangements may be more consistent with the tax definition of tenancy-in-common than the IRS’s guidance.
The IRS’s guidance provides that co-owners must share revenue
and expenses of the property in proportion to their undivided inter219
That requirement represents another deviaests in the property.
tion from common law. Common law provides fairly sophisticated
rules that determine co-owners’ shares of the profits and expenses of
220
the property. Common law allows co-owners to enforce their rights
to profits or expenses through an action for waste, contribution, or
221
accounting.
The rules have a degree of vagueness because coowners may settle differences through the equitable remedy of partition and courts hesitate to assume a supervisory role in ongoing co222
The rules do not, however, provide that
ownership relationships.
the co-owners must share revenues and expenses from the property

214

See Harlan E. Moore Charitable Trust, 9 F.3d 623 (deciding that a crop-sharing arrangement was not a profit-sharing arrangement, even though the landlord paid
some of the costs of farming the property).
215
See supra text accompanying notes 76–85 (explaining the master-lease structure).
216
Private Placement Memorandum—M.L., supra note 49.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.08, 2002-1 C.B. 733.
220
See generally Weible, supra note 114. (describing tenants’ rights to revenue and
responsibility for expenses of the property).
221
Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07.
222
Id.
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in proportion to their undivided interests in the property. A coowner’s right to income from the property or obligation to pay expenses of the property often depends upon whether the co-owner is
in possession of the property.
Under common law, nonpossessing co-owners generally are not
entitled to rent from co-owners who take possession of the property
223
Instead of claimbecause all co-owners have a right to possession.
ing a right to rent, a nonpossessing co-owner may take possession of
224
the property. A nonpossessing co-owner may, however, offset fair
rental value if a possessing co-owner makes expenditures with respect
to the property and seeks to recover a share of the expense through
225
An ousted co-owner who brings an acan action of contribution.
tion for accounting may be entitled to the fair rental value for the
226
ousted co-owner’s interest in the property. In the absence of an action for contribution or ejectment, however, the possessing co-owner
may enjoy the actual economic benefit of possessing the property.
Because a nonpossessing co-owner may not receive a benefit from the
property while the possessing co-owner enjoys possession, the common law does not appear to require proportionate sharing of revenue.
A co-owner who makes a payment necessary for the preservation
of title, such as property taxes or mortgage payments, may recover a
portion of the payment from other co-owners in an action for contribution only if the jurisdiction makes the co-owners personally liable
227
If the jurisdiction provides that payments are
for such payments.
only a charge against the property, the co-owner who makes payments may be able to recover a portion of the expenditures as a defensive offset in an action for accounting for rents collected from the
228
property or in a partition action.
Finally, if the co-owner who
makes payments is in sole possession of the property, the nonpossessing co-owner may offset the value of sole possession against claims for
229
contribution. The common law therefore does not require proportionate sharing of expenses, and if offset is the only recourse against a
223

Weible, supra note 114, at 559.
Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(c).
225
See Weible, supra note 30, at 566–75.
226
See id. at 558.
227
Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(b).
228
Id. (recognizing that the expense-paying co-owner may “attain the same economic result by equitable liens so that in case of partition (in kind or by sale and division of the proceeds) or in an action of accounting the tax-paying cotenant will be
compensated”); Weible, supra note 114, at 567.
229
Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(b)–(c).
224
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non-possessory co-owner, a significant amount of time could elapse
between the payment and recovery.
The greater sophistication of open tenancies-in-common suggests that co-owners would include revenue- and expense-sharing
provisions in the agreement instead of relying upon common-law re230
Because the IRS’s guidance generally prohibits co-owners
medies.
from managing or leasing the property, they each should have similar
ownership interests in the property. As a result, it would be a very
unusual situation (e.g., where a co-owner provides customary tenant
service) in which the co-owners consider anything other than proportionate sharing of the revenue and expenses of the property. Therefore, even though co-owners of close tenancies-in-common may not
agree to share revenue and expenses proportionately, co-owners of
open tenancies would likely always agree to do so, even without the
231
Consequently, the guidance’s
requirement in the IRS’s guidance.
232
deviation from the common law may be immaterial.
The IRS’s guidance generally prohibits co-owners from advanc233
ing funds to each other to cover expense contributions.
This prohibition also deviates from the common law rule, which may deny an
action for contribution by a co-owner who is in possession of the
234
The denial of contribution creates a de facto loan grantproperty.
ing the injured co-owner an equitable lien; on disposition or in an action for accounting, the party seeking contribution may recover the
230

Indeed, the co-ownership documents for both the managed property and the
master-lease structures include revenue and expense sharing provisions.
231
A dissatisfied owner of an interest in an open tenancy-in-common should be
able to enforce the agreement and require a distribution of revenue. In fact, the IRS
guidelines require the manager of an open tenancy-in-common to distribute revenue
(net of expenses) from the property to the co-owners within three months after receiving the revenue. Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.12, 2002-1 C.B. 733. That requirement
should help nullify the actions for contribution and accounting.
232
It would, however, result in allocations that do not reflect economic reality if a
co-owner provides customary tenant services. A co-owner who provides customary
tenant services should be allocated a share of revenue (or decreased share of expenses) to reflect compensation for the services. Proportionate sharing of revenue
and expenses would not account for the services, unless the co-owners pay the service
provider fair market value. Tax law should account for allocations that do not reflect
economic reality. See Bradley T. Borden, Partnership Tax Allocations and the Internalization of Tax-Item Transactions, 59 S.C. L. REV. 297, 333–44 (2008). This issue reveals
another reason why tax law should treat an arrangement as a tax partnership if an
owner contributes services to the arrangement.
233
Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.08, 2002-1 C.B. 733. The guidelines allow a co-owner to
borrow funds needed to meet expenses associated with the co-ownership interest
from another co-owner, the sponsor, or the manager only if the borrower accepts individual liability for the loan and it does not exceed thirty-one days. Id.
234
Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07(b).
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requested payments if appropriate.
Thus, the IRS prohibition appears to deviate from the common law of tenancies-in-common,
which allows equitable liens.
The IRS’s guidance also limits the parties from whom co-owners
may borrow against the property and their respective interests therein. Specifically, with respect to any debt encumbering the property
or any debt incurred to acquire an interest in the property, the lender cannot be a person related to a co-owner, the sponsor, the man236
This restriction should relate to
ager, or a lessee of the property.
the definition of tax partnership, but, as with many provisions in the
guidance, such relationships appear tenuous. If a loan is negotiated
at arm’s length and at fair market rates, it should not affect the classification of the arrangement, regardless of the relationship between
the lender and the co-owner or the role the lender plays in the arrangement. As with the rules regarding lease arrangements, this rule
places members of open tenancies-in-common at a competitive disadvantage. Members of other arrangements may borrow from related
parties without adversely affecting the arrangement’s classification.
The limits the IRS’s guidance placed on co-owners may increase their
costs of capital by limiting sources of financing.
The IRS’s prohibition against inter-co-owner lending finds little
support in economic theory. A lender who takes a security interest in
the property of a borrower also takes an interest in the property but
does not become an owner of the property. The lender may require
the borrower to seek lender approval before transferring, leasing,
improving, or further encumbering the property. Thus, by granting
a security interest, the borrower transfers some rights with respect to
the property and may subject the property to some lender restrictions. Nonetheless, the borrower retains all rights not contracted
237
Therefore, at the termination of the security
away to the lender.
interest, the borrower would have full control of the property and
238
should be the owner of the property.
The source of the loan
should not affect that analysis, and the IRS overreaches by prohibiting inter-co-owner loans.
The management features that derive from the IRS’s guidance
leave much to be desired. First, the guidance restricts the co-owners’
tendency to use profit sharing to influence manager behavior. Second, it places open tenancies-in-common at a competitive disadvan235
236
237
238

Id.
Rev. Proc. 2002-22, §6.14, 2002-1 C.B. 733.
See Grossman & Hart, supra note 201, at 695.
Id. at 694.
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tage by restricting the manner in which they may charge rent. Finally, it limits the source of financing for open tenancies-in-common.
The damage appears to be gratuitous because the tax definition of
tenancy-in-common neither prohibits profit sharing with managers or
tenants, nor does it restrict sources of financing. The IRS should,
therefore, revisit the guidance and make adjustments as necessary to
conform with partnership tax law and theory.
C. Marketability Features
The common law has traditionally accepted vague accounting
and distribution rules for tenancies-in-common because dissatisfied
co-owners could sell their interests or bring partition actions to terminate the relationship and receive an equitable portion of sale pro239
The IRS’s guidance imposes strict accounting and distribuceeds.
tion rules, but it expressly requires co-owners to retain the right to
240
dispose of their interests and partition the property.
It then allows
certain agreements that could help deter or prevent dispositions and
partition actions. For example, other co-owners or the promoter may
acquire an option to obtain an interest from a co-owner who con241
Such artemplates selling an interest or partitioning the property.
rangements could nullify the stated right to dispose of an interest or
partition the property. The IRS’s guidance thus appears to recognize
that strict accounting and reporting rules somewhat diminish the
need for free transferability and an absolute right to partition the
property. As long as co-owners have an ostensible right to partition
the property, however, the co-owners will be concerned about who
joins the arrangement. They will, therefore, use tools at their disposal to restrict the transfer of interests. Restricted transferability distinguishes open tenancies-in-common from open business arrangements.
Several conditions in the IRS’s guidance affect the marketability
of interests in open tenancies-in-common. At first blush, the marketability features appear most concerned with preserving the alienability of co-ownership interests and the co-owners’ rights to property—
features the IRS apparently believes are paramount to a tenancy-in-

239

Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07.
Rev. Proc. 2002-22, §6.08, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (requiring proportionate sharing of
revenue and expenses and the distribution of net revenues within three months after
the date of the receipt of the revenues); Id. § 6.06 (requiring co-owners to retain the
right to transfer, partition, and encumber their respective interests).
241
Co-owners may grant rights of first offer and first refusal, id. § 6.06, or call options in their interests, id. § 6.10.
240
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common classification. The marketability features thus limit the type
of restrictions co-owners can place on each other’s ability to dispose
242
of property or partition it. Transferability is a prominent feature of
243
traditional tenancies-in-common.
It stands in stark contrast to the
restrictions members of close business arrangements commonly place
244
The purpose of transfer restrictions in
on ownership interests.
close business arrangements is to keep ownership within a small control group—control being one of two primary concerns in close cor245
Members of close tenancies-in-common may have simiporations.
lar desires if they are fully informed when acquiring their interests.
Restricting transferability of interests and the right to partition would
eliminate a traditional remedy available to co-owners and require
other remedies to fill the void. Tax theory does not, however, suggest
that limitations on transferability and void-filling remedies should
dictate an arrangements’ classification.
Co-owners of close tenancies-in-common would appear to be
motivated by conditions similar to those that motivate members of
close business arrangements to restrict transfers of interests. Coowners would generally prefer to choose the persons with whom they
will co-own the property. Transferability of interests prevents members of close tenancies-in-common from choosing their co-owners.
Nonetheless, the common law appears to prevent tenants in common
from imposing such restrictions. Even if co-owners choose the persons with whom they originally form a tenancy-in-common, the inability to restrict transferability prohibits them from choosing future coowners. Co-owners cannot control who will own other interests in the
property, but they may sell their own interests if they become dissatisfied with other owners. If selling the interest is not feasible, a coowner can bring an action of partition to either receive a portion of
the property in severalty or a portion of the proceeds from the sale of
246
Thus, close tenancies-in-common invert the transferthe property.
ability feature commonly found in close business arrangements and

242

Id. § 6.06 (“In general, each co-owner must have the rights to transfer, partition, and encumber the co-owner’s undivided interest in the Property without the
agreement or approval of any person.”). The IRS’s guidance does not however prohibit restrictions on the right to transfer, partition, or encumber interests in the
property—if a lender requires such restrictions and the restrictions are consistent
with customary commercial lending practices. Id.
243
See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.02.
244
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 889–92.
245
See Moll, supra note 21, at 889–92. Liquidity is the other primary concern. Id.
246
Orth, supra note 30, § 32.07.
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subject themselves to the possibility of owning the property with undesirable co-owners.
As business arrangements grow and ownership and management
begin to diverge, transfer restrictions lose their appeal. Owners of
open business arrangements generally prefer free transferability of
interests because it encourages investment in the arrangement and
performs a monitoring function. Freely transferable interests are attractive to investors because the transferability provides a form of li247
Free transferability performs a monitoring function bequidity.
cause managers’ desire for inexpensive capital motivates them to act
in the best interest of shareholders to attract cheap capital. The free
transferability of ownership creates a market for the interests, and the
market value of the interests reflects the performance of management and helps align management’s interests with the owners’ inter248
Thus, free transferability of interests often distinguishes open
ests.
and close business arrangements and fulfills an important role for
open business arrangements.
Free transferability of interests in open tenancies-in-common is a
very unattractive feature because the members also have a right to
partition the property. Property held in open tenancies-in-common
generally will not be suitable for partition in kind. For example,
commercial or residential rental property (such as an office building
or an apartment complex) generally does not lend itself to physical
partition; partition by sale and distribution of proceeds may result in
a sale below the price the property could attract through a routine
market sale. Consequently, the co-owners of open tenancies-incommon will insist upon restricting the right to partition the property
or will restrict the right that other co-owners have to dispose of the
property in order to control who becomes a co-owner. Restricting
the right to dispose of the property will have limited effect in an open
tenancy-in-common. The co-owners in an open tenancy-in-common
are not familiar with each other, and they do not know each other’s
tendencies. They may join an arrangement with others who are inclined to partition the property. Thus, the right to partition is problematic in open tenancies-in-common and dampens the effect of
transfer restrictions.
As stated above, the right to partition is an important remedy in
close tenancies-in-common because other remedies are often vague
249
and courts prefer not to interfere. The right to partition is less im247
248
249

See Hansmann et al., supra note 29, at 1376–77.
See supra note 209.
See supra text accompanying note 222.
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portant in open tenancies-in-common that are structured pursuant to
the IRS’s guidance, because co-co-owners have a right, by agreement,
to a proportionate share of the property’s revenue and should receive
that share regularly. They can bring a breach of contract action to
enforce the agreement. Consequently, they do not need to use partition to enforce their rights to revenue. That being the case, the IRS’s
guidance should be able to dispense with the right-to-partition requirement. If the co-co-owners did not have a right to partition, restrictions on transferability would be less important. If the IRS eliminated the right-to-partition requirement co-owners may relax their
transfer restrictions. Until the IRS removes the right-to-partition requirement, co-co-owners will look for ways to restrict transferability of
interests.
The IRS’s guidance allows co-co-owners of open tenancies-incommon to grant call options in their interests and to grant other coowners the right of first offer or first refusal before selling an inter250
These permitted arrangements grant co-owners some control
est.
over who will become co-co-owners after formation of the open tenancy-in-common. The co-owners’ control cannot, however, exceed
the resources they have available to acquire the interests of a departing co-co-owner. Consequently, the ability to restrict transferability
through rights to acquiring interests may be limited. The inability to
effectively restrict transfer, and the owners’ right to partition, may ultimately affect the attractiveness of interests in open tenancies-incommon.
The IRS does not explain its reasoning for requiring free transferability and the right to partition. Presumably, the IRS had in mind
the alienability and partition features of common-law tenancies-incommon. Perhaps it reasoned that an arrangement could not be a
tenancy-in-common for tax purposes, unless the interests in the arrangement were transferable and the co-co-owners had the right to

250

See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.06, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (allowing rights of first offer and
first refusal,); id. at § 6.10 (allowing co-owners to grant call options in their interests).
The right of first offer grants the holder of the right the first opportunity to offer to
purchase an interest, in the event the owner of the interest decides to sell the interest. Id. § 6.06. The owner of an interest grants a right of first refusal to another person by agreeing to offer the interest to such other person before exercising the right
to transfer the interest. The IRS’s guidance appears to distinguish between rights of
first offer and rights of first refusal, limiting the use of the right of latter to situations
in which a co-owner contemplates partition. See id. Some commentators question
whether there is any practical distinction between a right of first offer and right of
first refusal. See Borden & Wyatt, supra note 1, at 20–21. Thus, the distinction the
IRS appears to draw may be meaningless in practice.
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251

partition.
Transferability of interests does not, however, make an
arrangement a tenancy-in-common. As stated above, a common fea252
ture of open business arrangements is transferability of interests.
In fact, free transferability is a relic of the entity-characteristic classifi253
cation regime.
Ironically, under the old classification regime, free
transferability was an arrangement constituting a tax corporation.
Transferability of interests no longer distinguishes tax partnerships
254
Close business arrangements with transfer
from tax corporations.
restrictions can be either tax corporations or tax partnerships. Similarly, open business arrangements with publicly-traded interests can
255
be either tax partnerships or tax corporations. Just as the other entity characteristics should not govern the tax classification of open
256
tenancies-in-common, neither should transferability.
Tax policy does not suggest that an arrangement with restricted
transferability of interests should be a business arrangement. If the
members of an arrangement can determine their shares of income
from the arrangement without computing income at the arrangement level, they do not need one of the tax regimes that govern busi257
Thus, tax policy does not explain the IRS’s
ness arrangements.
transferability requirement. The use of mechanisms in the coownership and management agreements that minimize the threat of
sale or partition indicates that open tenancy-in-common co-owners
prefer transfer and partition restrictions. The use of such restrictions
is likely a reaction to the right-to-partition requirement.
Because tax theory does not require co-owners to have the rights
to partition for an arrangement to be a tenancy-in-common, the IRS
could remove the right-to-partition requirement from its guidance.
Doing so would solve the issue related to free transferability. If coowners did not have to concern themselves with others partitioning
the property, they would be less concerned about who joined the arrangement as a co-owner. Consequently, they would naturally relax
restrictions on alienability. That would provide an additional check
on management performance. Co-owners would not demand the
251

See Orth, supra note 30, § 32.02.
See supra text accompanying notes 247–28.
253
See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1)(vi) (1960).
254
See id. §§ 301.7701-1 to 301.7701-3 (as amended in 2006).
255
I.R.C. § 7704(a) (2000). Tax law will, however, treat some publicly traded partnerships and limited liability companies as tax corporations, but that determination
does not depend upon the transferability of the arrangement’s interests. See id.
256
See supra text accompanying notes 171–77 (discussing the inappropriate use of
entity characteristics for classifying tenancies-in-common).
257
See Borden, supra note 140.
252
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right to partition because they have other remedies under the coownership arrangement. Thus, the IRS should remove the right-topartition requirement from its guidance.
Even with the right to partition, another impediment would
stand in the way of free transferability of interests. As discussed
above, the IRS’s guidance requires unanimous consent for some ac258
tions. All other actions require approval by co-owners owning a ma259
The unanimous-consent rejority of interests in the property.
quirement, in particular, presents potential for a minority holdup.
The co-owner with the smallest ownership interest can hold up the
hiring of a manager, the entrance of a new tenant, and financing ar260
rangements.
Such potential makes open tenancy-in-common interests less attractive. To prevent such possibilities, co-owners or managers will acquire call options in all interests. If a minority co-owner
threatens to hold up a decision requiring unanimous approval, the
other co-owners or manager may prevent the hold up by exercising
the call option. Such options restrict transferability of interests.
The unanimous-consent requirement and the right-to-partition
requirement create incentives for co-owners to restrict the transferability of interests in open tenancies-in-common. Those incentives
run contrary to the IRS’s free-transferability requirement because coowners will use call options and other permissible mechanisms to
prevent partition of the property and minority holdup. Because tax
theory does not require tenancies-in-common to grant partition
rights or require unanimous consent, the IRS should consider eliminating those requirements to help eliminate the transfer restrictions
that co-owners implement.
IV. FUTURE OF OPEN TENANCIES-IN-COMMON
The recent market downturn has diminished the demand for
261
open tenancies-in-common.
The rhetoric growth and recent diminished demand for open tenancies-in-common raise several questions about their relevance. First, are open tenancies-in-common vi258

See supra text accompanying notes 159.
Rev. Proc. 2002-22, §6.05, 2002-1 C.B. 733.
260
See id.
261
See TIC Industry Quarterly Statistics, TIC |TALK Q. (Omni Research & Consulting,
LLC, Salt Lake City, Utah) Fall 2008 at 4. (revealing that total equity invested in securitized open tenancies-in-common in through the first two quarters of 2008 was no
more than $800 million, a small fraction of the $3.7 billion peak in 2006—assuming
sustained performance through the end of 2008, the total 2008 investment in securitized open tenancies-in-common would be less than fifty percent of the 2006
amount).
259
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able absent the section 1031 tax preference? Second, assuming tax
law continues to favor interests in open tenancies-in-common, should
tax law preserve the cumbersome, and often uneconomic, structures
of open tenancies-in-common? Finally, are aspects and innovations
of open tenancies-in-common transferable to close tenancies-incommon?
A. Viability in Absence of Section 1031 Benefits
As discussed above, open tenancies-in-common are the brain
child of entrepreneurial real estate syndicators who seized an opportunity to provide accessible section 1031 replacement property to a
262
Generally, open tenancy-in-common
particular market segment.
investors are property owners looking to relieve themselves of property management responsibilities, preserve the value of their property
through section 1031 gain deferral, and maintain or improve the return they have been realizing on their investments. Because investors
generally can find similar non-tax characteristics in other real estate
investment vehicles, section 1031 appears to influence the choice to
invest in open tenancies-in-common. Some investors consider the
front-end tax consequences of the investment in an open tenancy-incommon. Those investors want to invest section 1031 proceeds in
real estate to avoid tax on the disposition of their relinquished property. Other open tenancy-in-common investors may be attracted by
the back-end tax consequences. The tax classification of open tenancies-in-common enables the investors to dispose of an open tenancyin-common interest tax free, if they reinvest the sales proceeds in likekind real property. Consequently, some open tenancy-in-common
investors bring non-exchange money to open tenancies-in-common,
but they consider the back-end tax consequences when making the
investment. Thus, section 1031 motivates both front-end and backend open tenancy-in-common investors.
Because open tenancies-in-common focus primarily on the tax
benefits of section 1031, one thesis is that they would not exist but for
section 1031. To test that thesis, consider what an investor would do
if section 1031 did not benefit open tenancies-in-common. Assume
Olivia owns real property that she manages. Olivia decides to divest
the property to relieve herself of property-management responsibilities. Assuming section 1031 does not grant preference to open tenancy-in-common interests, Olivia will recognize taxable gain on the
disposition, regardless of where she invests the proceeds from the sale
262

See supra text accompanying notes 9–12.
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of her property. She wants to reinvest in real estate, but she does not
want to have any management responsibilities. She has decided that
the best way to obtain her objectives is to invest in some form of open
real estate ownership arrangement. Her investment choices include
an open tenancy-in-common, an interest in a limited partnership
holding real estate, or stock in a real estate investment trust
263
Various factors will affect Olivia’s reinvestment decision.
(REIT).
For example, Olivia will likely consider the liquidity of the interest
she acquires, the extent to which co-owners control or influence the
manager, her exposure to liability, the simplicity of the arrangement,
and the tax treatment of the various alternatives.
The three alternatives offer varying degrees of liquidity. An interest in a publicly-traded REIT would provide significant liquidity.
Although interests in open tenancies-in-common are ostensibly transferable, they may have no secondary market, and transfer restrictions
may make dispositions of open tenancy-in-common interests difficult.
The threat of a rogue co-owner threatening to partition the property
would also negatively affect the marketability of an interest. The interest in the limited partnership may be publicly traded, and, there264
If interests in the limited partnerfore, it may be very marketable.
ship are publicly traded, however, her investment would be liquid.
Thus, if Olivia prefers a liquid investment, her choice will be between
the interest in a publicly-traded REIT and a publicly-traded limited
partnership. An interest in an open tenancy- in-common would be
less liquid because a secondary market for such interests has not de265
veloped, and it would be subject to some transfer restrictions.
Although Olivia will be one of numerous members of the arrangement in which she invests, she will likely be concerned about
the extent to which co-owners may control or influence management.
In typical open business arrangements that separate ownership from
management, owners often use profit sharing and equity compensa266
tion to help align managers’ interests with the owners.
Thus, even
though individual members may not carry significant influence, as a
263

A REIT is a tax-favored real estate ownership structure that can avoid entity
level tax by distributing or reinvesting its income. See I.R.C. § 857(b) (2000). Members of REITs pay tax on income they receive from the REIT. See id. Therefore,
REITs are not subject to the double-tax regime that applies to tax corporations.
264
See Larry E. Ribstein, The Rise of the Uncorporation 22-24 (Univ. Ill. Law & Econ.
Pub. Research Working Paper No. LE07-026, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1003790 (describing economic and legal attributes of publicly traded partnerships and REITs).
265
See supra text accompanying notes 250.
266
See supra note 204.
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body, the owners may establish policies that help influence manager
behavior. Co-owners of open tenancies-in-common cannot use profit
267
Instead, co-owners vote
sharing to influence manager behavior.
annually to retain managers, but often a negative vote is subject to
buyout provisions that could cost the dissenter an interest in the ar268
The managers of open tenancies-in-common retain
rangement.
269
significant control over their rights to manage the property.
Furthermore, the lack of a public market for interests in open tenanciesin-common may exert less pressure on managers to act in the best interests of the co-owners. Even though the promoters/managers must
disclose their prior performance in offering memoranda, that information may travel slower than information relating to a publicly
traded company. Thus, co-owners in open tenancies-in-common appear to have less influence over managers than do owners of other
types of open real estate ownership arrangements. That would tend
to lead Olivia to an investment form other than an open tenancy-incommon.
Olivia will likely wish to protect herself from liability arising from
the management and ownership of the property. Each of the three
alternatives can provide her liability protection. Owners of limited
partnership interests and interests in REITs are protected by statutory
270
Co-owners of open tenancy-in-common interests
limited liability.
can form wholly owned limited liability companies to hold their indi271
vidual interests. Because Olivia can obtain limited liability with any
of the alternatives, liability protection likely would not influence her
decision.
The arrangement’s simplicity will be important to Olivia, because it will affect her understanding of the arrangement and the cost
to structure and manage it. Open tenancies-in-common are contractual arrangements governed by common law. They require extensive
documentation and do not have a long track record. Many questions
267

See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.12, 2002-1 C.B. 733.
See Confidential Private Placement Memoranda—P.M., supra note 49. Even
though the dissenter may receive fair value for the interest, if the investor is unable
to reinvest in like-kind property pursuant to section 1031, the tax liability of the
transaction would diminish the benefit of the buyout.
269
See supra note 72.
270
See UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT § 303, 6A U.L.A. 418 (2008) (providing that limited
partners are not liable for partnership liabilities); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6.22
(2007) (providing that shareholders are not liable for acts or debts of the corporation).
271
Such ownership does not frustrate the direct ownership requirement in the
IRS’s guidance. See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.01, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (allowing coownership through a disregarded entity).
268

BORDEN (FINAL)

438

4/6/2009 10:53:08 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:387
272

still exist regarding legal aspects of open tenancies-in-common.
Limited partnerships and corporations are the product of state statutory law. State law may grant contractual freedom to members of
such arrangements, but the law generally provides default rules for
273
That statutory structure
those areas not addressed in contracts.
adds certainty to the formation, ownership, and management of such
arrangements. Consequently, such arrangements are generally simpler than open tenancies-in-common. Furthermore, the prevalence
and history of other arrangements make them more familiar to investors and advisors. Thus, Olivia will prefer the simplicity of the other
arrangements over the open tenancy-in-common.
Finally, Olivia will consider the taxation of the various arrangements. If Olivia acquires an interest in a limited partnership, she will
generally be taxed on her allocable share of partnership tax items in
274
Partners may also
accordance with the partnership agreement.
275
Consequently,
benefit from allocations of partnership liabilities.
tax partnerships are attractive forms of business arrangements.
REITs provide less tax latitude for allocating tax items, but they allow
276
the owners to obtain a single level of taxation in any business form.
Thus, if Olivia prefers an interest in a publicly traded company, she
may prefer stock in a REIT. If Olivia acquires an interest in an open
tenancy-in-common, she will be taxed on income from her interest in
the property. The tax treatment of the various alternatives does not
provide a definitive choice for Olivia. Each alternative has unique tax
treatment, but no one single tax treatment is clearly better than the
others in all situations. Olivia will have to choose from the various alternatives based upon her individual preferences.
This analysis does not conclusively identify the investment vehicle Olivia would choose in the absence of section 1031 nonrecognition. Simplicity, liquidity, and owner control favor the limited partnership and REIT investments.
Tax aspects of the various
arrangements do not factor in as a general matter. Consequently,
simplicity, liquidity, and owner control indicate that Olivia would
272

See supra text accompanying notes 123–211 (questioning whether state law will
accept the classification of open tenancies-in-common).
273
See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 21, at 237.
274
I.R.C. § 704(a) (2000). The IRS will respect allocations expressed in the partnership agreement if they have substantial economic effect. See § 704(b).
275
See id. § 752 (providing that changes in partners’ shares of partnership liabilities are constructive contributions or distributions); Treas. Reg. § 1.752-2(b)(3) (as
amended in 2006) (providing that partners may determine by contract which partner will bear the obligation of a partnership liability).
276
See supra note 263.
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likely choose the limited partnership or REIT over the open tenancyin-common, in the absence of the section 1031 benefit. This analysis
indicates that without section 1031 benefits investors probably would
not acquire interests in open tenancies-in-common. Thus, open tenancies-in-common do not appear to be viable without the section
1031 benefits. Nonetheless, there is no indication that section 1031
will disappear or cease to favor interests in open tenancies-incommon. Therefore, they will probably remain a viable part of the
real estate market, and they deserve greater attention to help deal
with their significant shortcomings.
B. Disregarded Multiple-Member Arrangements
The complexity of open tenancies-in-common is one disadvantage they present. The complexity stems in part from the IRS generally prohibiting the co-owners from owning the property indirectly
277
By ruling that a
through a commonly owned separate legal entity.
multiple-member Delaware statutory trust, if properly formed and
278
structured, may be disregarded for federal tax purposes, the IRS
has already allowed a multiple-member legal entity to be an open tenancy-in-common. That ruling suggests that perhaps different legal
279
entities (such as limited liability companies or limited partnerships)
should also be disregarded, if properly formed and structured. The
tax issue is whether an arrangement with a separate legal entity holding the property should be treated as a separate entity for tax purposes. If treated as a separate entity, the arrangement would be a tax
partnership, and the interests could not qualify for section 1031 non280
The definition of tax partnership should govern that
recognition.

277

Other sources of complexity are the unanimous-consent and right-to-partition
requirements discussed supra at text accompanying notes 159–79,242–61.
278
See Rev. Rul. 2004-86, 2004-2 C.B. 191; supra Part II.C. (discussing the use of
Delaware statutory trusts to own open tenancy-in-common property).
279
Some states allow the formation of limited partnerships with the general partner taking no economic interest in the arrangement. See, e.g., TEX. BUS. ORGS. ANN §
153.101(c) (Vernon 2006). Such a structure would permit a nonowner to manage
the property.
280
See I.R.C. § 1031(a)(2)(D) (2000) (excluding partnership interests from assets
eligible for section 1031 nonrecognition); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (as amended in
2006) (providing a general definition of separate entity); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as
amended in 2007) (defining business entity and providing that an arrangement incorporated under state law shall be a tax corporation); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 (as
amended in 2006) (providing that all multiple-member business entities that are not
tax corporations are tax partnerships by default or tax corporations by election).
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classification, and partnership tax theory should influence the defini281
tion.
As stated above, partnership tax theory suggests that an arrangement should be a tax partnership only if it needs the partner282
That need arises only if
ship tax accounting and reporting rules.
members have a residual claim in both the property and services of
283
the arrangement. The freedom to contract in limited liability companies and all forms of partnership allows the members to create arrangements that separate the residual claims of property from residual claims of services. For example, the parties may agree that the
service provider, i.e., the manager, will receive a membership interest
in a limited liability company but restrict the manager’s control of the
284
property. The limited liability company’s operating agreement may
limit the manager’s vote on matters such as decisions to dispose of
the property, encumber it, or alter lease terms in the case of a property with major tenants. The other owners may retain the right to
remove the manager by majority vote and terminate the employment
arrangement by distributing any unpaid share of profits.
As states continue to relax the default rules of noncorporate entities (by extending the availability of statutory trusts, for example),
individuals will have greater freedom to structure ownership arrangements with legal entities. The IRS should recognize that freedom and allow co-owners to indirectly own property in open tenancies-in-common through mutually owned legal entities. Through
those separate entities, the co-owners could contract with a property
manager, enter into leases, and borrow against the property. The use
of a separate legal entity would likely deprive co-owners of the right
to partition the property. As stated above, however, the right to partition does not appear to be essential to tenancy-in-common classifica285
Once
tion and should be eliminated from the IRS’s guidance.
freed from that burden, the interests would be more freely transferable, and a separate legal entity would facilitate such transferability,
eliminating some of the major complexities of open tenancies-incommon.

281

See Borden, supra note 24, at 931–32.
See supra text accompanying notes 139–44.
283
See Borden, supra note 140.
284
The Author suggests in another venue that private equity managers may indeed be employed by investors even though they become members of limited partnerships. See Bradley T. Borden, Profits-Only Partnership Interests, 74 BROOK. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1262493.
285
See supra text accompanying notes 251–56.
282
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C. Transferable New Knowledge
Bringing together several unassociated persons to form an open
tenancy-in-common merges disparate interests and creates a significant pool of resources. The pool of resources is sufficient to attract
legal advisors, tax advisors, and the IRS to carefully consider the issues in depth and create new ownership structures. Concepts that result from that work are now available to lawyers advising members of
close tenancies-in-common. Aspects of open tenancy-in-common
structures will be attractive to members of close tenancies-in286
For example, the revenue- and expense-sharing provicommon.
sions in open tenancy-in-common arrangements would help eliminate some of the uncertainty regarding co-owners’ rights to income
and obligations for expenses under common law. The rights of first
offer and first refusal and option agreements in open tenancy-incommon documents would help co-owners of close tenancies-incommon restrict the transferability and partition rights of their co287
owners.
The management and lease structures used by open tenanciesin-common may also benefit co-owners of close tenancies-in-common.
Instead of an independent third party managing the property, however, a co-owner of a close tenancy-in-common will likely manage the
property either directly or through a closely-held management com288
The co-ownership and management agreements will have to
pany.
limit the scope of services that a co-owner can provide to ensure
289
compliance with the IRS’s guidance.
Nonetheless, the open tenancy-in-common structure can provide guidance to the advisor creating the close-tenancy-in-common structure. If limited management
creates problems, then the parties may decide to use a master-lease
structure. Again, models of open tenancies-in-common will inform
the creation of such structures for close tenancies-in-common.
Because open tenancies-in-common generally comply with the
IRS’s guidance, the IRS should not challenge the classification of
close tenancies-in-common that adopt features of open tenancies-in286

Documents drafted for close tenancies-in-common incorporate features of
open tenancies-in-common, providing evidence that close tenancies-in-common will
adopt features of open tenancies-in-common. See, e.g., BORDEN, supra note 11, app. F.
287
See id. at F-6 through F-7 (providing examples of buy-sell agreements that may
appear in documents used by co-owners of close tenancies-in-common).
288
See id. at app. F (providing sample documents that comtemplate an affiliate of
one of the co-owners managing the property but providing no more than customary
tenant services).
289
See Rev. Proc. 2002-22, § 6.11, 2002-1 C.B. 733 (limiting the services that a coowner can provide to customary tenant services).
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common.
In fact, the IRS has ruled privately that its guidance also
291
The effort that lawyers and
applies to close tenancies-in-common.
others have devoted to structure open tenancies-in-common will serve
advisors of close tenancies-in-common who also wish to structure
ownership arrangements to comply with the IRS’s guidance. Thus,
many aspects of open tenancies-in-common may find application in
close tenancies-in-common. Adopting already-created concepts gives
members of smaller arrangements access to tools formerly unavailable due to resource restrictions.
V. CONCLUSION
Even if open tenancies-in-common would not exist without the
demand created by the tax law, tax law currently supports open tenancies-in-common and greater attention should focus on them. More
attention from academics and commentators outside the tax realm
will help this new form of investment vehicle evolve in a manner that
will provide greater protection for investors and more direction for
promoters, broker-dealers, and other market participants. Open tenancies-in-common differ from close tenancies-in-common primarily
in their ownership composition. The different ownership composition affects the economic nature of the two types of tenancies-incommon. Consequently, the parties to the various types of arrangements often seek different legal attributes in the differing arrangements.
A significant body of economic research and analysis considers
close and open business arrangements such as corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies. That analysis helps explain
why business participants form arrangements that separate ownership
and management, and use various legal mechanisms to establish the
relationship among co-owners and between owners and managers.
Tax commentators have also focused extensive efforts on explaining
the perceived need (or lack thereof) of different tax regimes for close
and open business arrangements. Little attention, however, has focused on the various aspects of open and close tenancies-in-common.
The comparisons of close and open business arrangements help inform the analysis of closed and open tenancies-in-common. This Article demonstrates that such commentary and analysis helps expose
weaknesses in the IRS’s guidance and provides grounds for recom-

290

See supra text accompanying note 98 (discussing the legal significance of the
IRS’s guidance).
291
See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2008-26-005 (June 27, 2008).
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mending change. Further analysis should help refine the structures
further and lead to better guidance from the IRS.
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APPENDIX A: COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF CLOSE AND OPEN
TENANCIES-IN-COMMON AND BUSINESS ARRANGEMENTS
Close Tenancyin-Common

Open Tenancyin-Common

Direct ownership of

Direct ownership of

Indirect ownership

Indirect ownership

interest in property.

interest in property.

of property.

of property.

No limit on number

Thirty-five-co-owner

No limit on number

No limit on number

of co-owners.

limit.

of members.

of members.

Intent of parties rele-

Intent to form busi-

Intent of parties

Intent of parties rele-

vant to classification.

ness arrangement

relevant to classifica-

vant to classification.

prohibited.

tion.

Business entity

Partnership, limited

Partnership, limited

prohibited.

liability company,

liability company,

corporation, or other

corporation, or other

legal form.

legal form.

No business form.

Close Business
Arrangement

Open Business
Arrangement

Co-ownership

Formal co-ownership

Less formal govern-

Formal governing

agreement tradition-

agreement.

ing documents.

documents.

Right to sell interest

Right of first

Buy-sell agreements

Typically publicly

or partition.

refusal / offer before

typical.

traded.

ally informal, if
extant.

exercising right to
partition, call
options
Unity of possession

Unanimous

Ownership and

Ownership and

grants each co-owner

approval to hire

management typi-

management typically

right to manage

manager, sell, or

cally combined, but

separate.

property, hire a

lease property, and

all management au-

manager, or lease

to create or modify

thority is delegable.

interests. Co-owners

blanket lien. Co-

cannot sell or

owners can only

encumber other

provide customary

co-owners’ interests.

tenant services.
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Open Tenancyin-Common

Close Business
Arrangement

Open Business
Arrangement

Action of account,

Co-owners must

If governing

Governing documents

action for contribu-

share revenues and

documents are

should determine how

tion, and action of

expenses in propor-

silent, state law will

and when profits are

waste determine co-

tion to ownership in-

generally allocate

distributed.

owners rights to in-

terests.

income and loss

come and obligations

equally.

for expenses.
Co-owners may enter

Co-owners must

Owners are jointly

Members not liable

into agreements that

share blanket-lien

and severally liable

for business liabilities.

determine their

mortgage in

for business liabili-

respective shares of

proportion to owner-

ties, unless organ-

blanket-lien indebt-

ship

ized as a limited

edness.

interests.

partnership, limited
liability company, or
corporation.

No restrictions on

Sharing profits with

No restrictions on

No restrictions on

methods used to

managers is prohib-

methods used to

methods used to

determine manager

ited.

determine manager

determine manager

compensation.

compensation.

compensation.

